

VLADIMER PAPA

no
9

XENOPHON PAPER

THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEX
IN THE BLACK SEA AREA:
THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS



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PREFACE

Despite the widely divergent economies of the countries of the Black Sea region in terms of structure and levels of development, a number of common challenges concern them as a whole. Among these, the global economic and financial crisis has deeply affected the region collectively and each country individually.

Written by Vladimer Papava, a well-known economist and policy practitioner, this *Xenophon Paper* touches upon the consequences of the crisis on the countries of the Black Sea region in a specific analytical framework. Based on his own “theory of necroeconomics,” Papava assesses, in the context of the ongoing crisis, the key economic obstacles that the countries of the region face in achieving sustainable economic development. His analysis is based on two economic phenomena: the “necroeconomy” and the “zombie-economy.” A “necroeconomy,” which is created by uncompetitive industries (the “necrocompanies”) that are remnants of the command economy, differentiates the economy of post-Communist capitalism from all other models of capitalism. In times of economic crisis, though, “necrocompanies” can also appear in developed economies, as “zombie-firms,” creating a “zombie-economy.”

Following his theory, the author divides the countries of the Black Sea region in two groups: transition states (the “leaders,” to the extent they overcame their Communist past and the “outsiders,” for those that are enslaved by their Communist heritage) and non-transition states (Turkey and Greece). Thus, the key objectives and the means to achieve them differ for each country according to the category they belong. Based on the abovementioned categorisation, Papava’s analysis suggests that while most of the “outsider” countries are more vulnerable to the consequences of the crisis, non-transition states and the “leader” countries are likely to face better economic conditions in the post-crisis period.

In times when economic analysts employ various techniques to speculate about what the future might hold, the sobering reality is that these techniques become ineffective when the human factor is ignored. As the author suggests, in the post-crisis period, only states whose governments possess the political determination to cease managing the economy through zombie-ing mechanisms will eventually thrive. In this sense, Vladimer Papava’s paper is an important contribution to the better understanding of the economic forces at work in the Black Sea region.

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Athens, May 2010

INTRODUCTION

Currently, the Black Sea Region¹ is not as integrated economically as to allow one to outline some common development trends of all regional economies. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the fact that most of the region's nations (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine), except Greece and Turkey, are post-Communist countries, one can forecast to a certain degree of precision the ultimate outcome of the market-oriented reforms implemented in these countries.

It is hardly surprising that achieving high economic growth rates is not a key priority for the Black Sea countries. The problem is that the region is not homogeneous since it includes different economies like those of European Union (EU) member states (Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania), some post-Communist countries which are not EU members, and Turkey which is negotiating its accession to the EU. The key challenge for the post-Communist non-EU countries is to achieve some general European economic standards and, hence, to enhance their economic growth rates. Thus, in the post-Communist non-EU member countries, the enhancement of economic growth rates must be a result of properly planned and implemented market-oriented reforms.

More than twenty years have passed since the beginning of the period of post-Communist transition to a market economy. Naturally, this has resulted in the accumulation of a rather rich experience overall which allows us to make some generalisations. It may be asserted that market economies, as such, have been established in almost all of the countries of the former Socialist bloc with the period of transition over and the individual newly-independent states having passed through this period with varying degrees of success.²

Some of the countries were so successful in moving towards a market economy that they even achieved EU membership, whereas others – in fact, all of the post-Soviet states with the exception of the Baltic states – became “prisoners” of their own product; that is, post-Communist capitalism, an idiomorphic phenomenon of modern times.

It must be emphasised in this respect that due to the contemporary global economic and financial crisis, the countries of the Black Sea Region have come to face the same general difficulties

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- 1 The term Black Sea Region encompasses the twelve member states of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
 - 2 Belarus is perhaps the only exception (see, for example, Rafal Antachak, Michail Guzhinski and Petr Kozarzhevski, eds., *Beloruskaia ekonomika: ot rynka k plany* [Economy of Belarus from Market to Planned Economy] Vol. II (Warsaw: CASE, 2001).

as the rest of the world and that if the desired end result is to successfully overcome the crisis, these could and should be addressed with common efforts.³ According to some experts, the economic growth rate across the countries of the region is expected to reach -6% in 2009.⁴ Unsurprisingly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions have closely cooperated with various countries of the Black Sea Region during the global economic and financial crisis.⁵

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the economic development difficulties of the post-Communist Black Sea Region and to examine the key economic problems of all the countries encompassing it in the context of the ongoing financial crisis. Yet, before analysing the region's economic challenges, some general trends and threats present in practically all post-Communist countries will be touched upon. In fact, this is a logical standing-point because the economies of the post-Communist countries of the region suffer from the same basic problems as all the other post-Communist countries, with the global financial crisis having created some common threats for all the post-Communist countries of the world.

3 Panayotis Gavras and Ghinea Arminio Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," *ICBSS Policy Brief*, no. 18 (Athens: ICBSS, October 2009), http://icbss.org/images/pb_no18.pdf.

4 *Ibid.*, 7.

5 *Ibid.*, 6, 15. See also, Anders Åslund, "Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Eastern Europe," *Development & Transition*, no. 13, July 2009, 2, http://www.developmentandtransition.net/uploads/issue-Attachments/25/DT.13_English_FINAL.pdf; Anders Åslund, "The Eastern Europe Financial Crisis," *CASE Network Studies & Analyses*, no. 395/2009 (Warsaw: CASE, 2009), 21-24, http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/27584614_CN5A_395_Dec%2017.pdf; International Monetary Fund, *Regional Economic Outlook: Europe* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, October 2009), 19-20, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2009/EUR/eng/ereo1009.pdf>.

CHAPTER 1

THE POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES AND THE MAIN THREAT OF THE MODERN GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

Two Trajectories of Economic Transformation of the Post-Communist Economies

Almost two decades since the beginning of the historic process of the transition to the market economy, it is possible to draw a number of important conclusions about the path already traversed in transforming a Communist economy into a market economy.⁶ Although a plethora of scholarly publications exists on the subject of the transition period, there are no generally accepted criteria for determining its completion. However, the simplest formal answer to this question seemingly suggests itself: if the EU recognises a country as a transition economy ready to enter its ranks, then in all probability one should concede that the transition period in this country has been completed and that its functioning economic system for all practical purposes has become a market-based European one.

As is well known, the majority of the Eastern European as well as the three Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) have become members of the EU. On the whole, one can interpret this as the completion of their transition period; that is, the period of transition to the European type market economy. In other words, these countries are “leaders” in passing through the transition period with success. Henceforth, the term “leaders” will refer to these countries. What about other post-Communist Black Sea Region countries like Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine, those who are “outsiders?” Are they still in transition phase? It is obvious that these countries, which were “outsiders,” are still far from emerging European capitalism. Capitalism by its nature is not homogenous.⁷ The transition period in “outsider” post-Communist countries has ended, but unfortunately the economic (and not only economic) system of some is far from a European style of capitalism. It is better to characterise it as “Post-Communist capitalism,”⁸ that is, a society which cannot be squeezed into the classic

6 See, for example, Anders Åslund, *How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

7 See, for example, Harry F. Dahms, ed., *Transformations of Capitalism: Economy, Society and the State in Modern Times* (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 2000); Robert N. Gwynne, Thomas Klak and Denis J. B. Shaw, *Alternative Capitalisms: Geographies of Emerging Regions* (London: Arnold, 2003); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

8 Vladimer Papava, *Necroeconomics: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism* (New York: iUniverse, 2005); Michael D. Kennedy and Elizabeth Igen, “Post-Communist Capitalism and Transition Culture in Georgia,” *Caucasus & Globalization* 1, no. 2 (2007): 53-6.

understanding of the word “capitalism” or within any other theoretically generalised model of capitalism.⁹ The logic of this problem appears to be rather simple: if the collapse of the Communist system was essentially simultaneous in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), it follows that initially all were basically in the same situation and, consequently, the dragging out of the transition period to European capitalism is an artificial delay in reforming the economy (and society, more broadly). This all-inclusive answer in itself raises many questions about the causes of the artificial slowdown in the reform process which has resulted in post-Communist capitalism.

As the key to understanding the principal problems of post-Communist transformation in the “outsiders,” it is expedient to conduct a comparative analysis of these countries with the “leaders” described above.

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, together with the nearly simultaneous emergence of new independent states in lieu of the USSR and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, placed new issues on the agenda which transcended the classic explanatory framework of economics. Hence, economic scholarship proved virtually powerless to provide a theoretically grounded answer to such questions as: how should one make the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy?

It is not surprising that this process of transition, especially in its initial phase, proceeded under the well-known method of “trial and error.”¹⁰ Against this background of the inability of economic science to deal with the transformation processes, the presence of the institutions of statehood was undervalued from the very beginning of the transition period. In particular, the states that were formed as a result of the dissolution of the federal formations (the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and that were not the direct legal successors of these federal states lacked the institutions of statehood. As a result, their process of transition was compounded by the need to construct these institutions from the very beginning.¹¹ Under these conditions, the implementation of economic reforms according to schemas that had

9 See, for example, David Coates, *Models of Capitalism: Growth and Stagnation in the Modern Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., *Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence & Diversity* (London: Sage Publications, 1997).

10 See, for example, Vladimer Papava, “On the Theory of Post-Communist Economic Transition to Market,” *International Journal of Social Economics* 32, no. 1/2 (2005): 77-97.

11 Leszek Balcerowicz, *Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation* (Budapest: CEU, 1995), 146. The transition process to a market economy and the construction of institutions of statehood in the former German Democratic Republic was considerably more simplified since it had been preceded by a union with the Federal Republic of Germany [see, for example, Hans-Ulrich Derlien, “The Triple Revolution: Administrative Transformation in the Former GDR,” in *The State after Communism: Administrative Transition in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Barbara Nunberg (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999), 195-235].

counted upon the utilisation of the corresponding institutions of the state (which were lacking in these countries) was foreordained to failure.

The advantage of the majority of the “leader” countries, compared with the “outsider” countries, was the presence of institutions of statehood which significantly simplified and, thereby, accelerated the resolution of tasks associated with the transition to a market economy. Nevertheless, this factor cannot be deemed decisive in delaying the transition process in all “outsider” countries, for there are the examples of Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic countries that are EU member states, or Croatia, having the status of an EU candidate country. Their example refutes the thesis about the fundamental impossibility of a rapid transition to a market economy amidst the process of creating these state institutions. As for the success of Croatia,¹² Slovakia¹³ or the Baltic countries¹⁴ in reforming their economies and, simultaneously, constructing the institutions of statehood, this is fundamentally explained by the targeted thrust of measures adopted by the reformist governments in these countries.¹⁵ This, in turn, is explained by the human factor, which will be discussed below.

Necroeconomy: The Legacy of the Communist Past

In order to understand the essence of the economic foundations of post-Communist capitalism, one has to analyse one of the key peculiarities of a command economy: that is, the quality of its material and technical bases.

It is common knowledge that a command economy due to its very nature excludes any possibility for the existence of any forms of competitive relationships either domestically or internationally – inside any distinct economy or between different command economies. The majority of command economies used to be integrated into one big common economic space. The former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which existed for approximately forty years and was governed by a coordinating organ, is perhaps the best example of this. Economic cooperation with market economies was maintained upon a very limited basis and exclusively at an inter-governmental level.

12 See, for example, Zoran Anušić, Željko Rohatinski and Velimir Sonje, eds., *A Road to Low Inflation: Croatia 1993/1994* (Zagreb: The Government of the Republic of Croatia, 1995).

13 See, for example, Marek Jakoby et al., “Overall Economic Development,” in *Slovakia 2004. A Global Report on the State of Society*, ed. Grigorij Mesežnikov and Miroslav Kollár (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2005), 389-451.

14 See, for example, Luis M. Valdivieso, *Macroeconomic Developments in the Baltics, Russia and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union*, Occasional Paper 175 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1998).

15 See, for example, Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Reforms in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in the Light of the East Asian Experiences,” *CASE Network Studies and Analyses*, no. 39 (Warsaw: CASE, 1995).

The absence of competition in command economies quashed the only effective stimulus for economic development. As a result, the quality of products, as a rule, was very low – as were their prices – which were maintained artificially by means of national budgetary subsidies. The key sources of the former Soviet Union’s national budget revenues included the sales of alcoholic beverages and the export of raw materials (such as oil) which represented the only stable channel for the accumulation of foreign currency reserves.

In studying key aspects of the economic system of the Communist regime in Poland, Adam Lipowski came to the conclusion that when the whole world was divided between the “developed” and the “developing” countries, those with command economies could not qualify as belonging to either categorisation. He, thus, invented the term of “misdeveloped” countries specifically for command economies.¹⁶ In such cases of “misdevelopment,” Lipowski asserted that

- the share of industries in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was too high because of a low percentage of domestic and foreign trade and services;
- a significant portion of industrial production accounted for manufacturing production as opposed to the comparatively small output of consumer goods;
- the volume of high quality competitive products capable of meeting international standards was very limited;
- the major part of industrial output included goods which were generally useless to customers; and
- the share of outdated products in industrial output was too high.

After the collapse of the Communist regimes and their command economies, the countries of the former Socialist bloc found themselves with only a very small amount of goods to supply to the global market. With few exceptions, such as some hydro energy outputs, oil and gas extraction and the primary processing of raw materials, manufactured goods failed to meet the high international standards as a result of their overall low quality and/or high prices. In fact, no markets existed for these particular products. Moreover, in principle, there was no way that they could have existed in that an economy of this type is nothing more than a corpse or a so-called “necroeconomy”¹⁷ or, similarly, a “virtual economy.”¹⁸ The economic theory which deals with this kind of economy is called “necroeconomic theory” or “necroeconomics.”¹⁹

16 Adam Lipowski, *Towards Normality: Overcoming the Heritage of Central Planning Economy in Poland in 1990-1994* (Warsaw: CASE, 1998), 9.

17 Vladimer Papava, “Necroeconomy – A Phenomenon of the Post-Communist Transition Period,” *Problems of Economic Transition* 44, no. 8 (2001): 77-89.

18 Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, “Russia’s Virtual Economy,” *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (1998): 53-67; Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, *Russia’s Virtual Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutions Press, 2002); David Woodruff, *Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

19 Vladimer Papava, “Necroeconomics – The Theory of Post-Communist Transformation of an Economy,”

Lipowski uses the term “divesting” (as an antonym to “investing”) in order to describe the process of a command economy being “stripped.”²⁰ This amounts to “liberating” the post-Communist economy from the list of pathologies characterising a “misdeveloped economy”²¹ which, in this author’s opinion, is the way in which a necroeconomy develops.

Naturally, even if one part of an economy is dead, the rest may still be alive which can be referred to as its “vital economy” or “vitaconomy.” Accordingly, the economic theory which deals with this kind of economy is called “vitaeconomic theory” or “vitaconomics.” By its substance, this is nothing more than economic theory itself – or economics in its common meaning – because economic theory, as such, is something which deals with the economy as a vital system. All of the aforementioned lead us to the following question: what does a necroeconomy have in common with a vitaconomy and how do they differ?

In a necroeconomy, like in a vitaconomy, some goods may be produced which in fact means that supply may exist. In contrast to the goods produced in a vitaconomy, however, those emanating from a necroeconomy are in a situation of no demand owing to their low quality and/or high prices.

If any segment of an economy is “dead,” then theoretically there should be no problems within. Common sense tells us that a necroeconomy cannot have any influence over its vital parts. Under the conditions of a market economy, economic theory prescribes that uncompetitive production must disappear and, at the same time, should not create any significant problems for the rest of the economy. This explains the limited focus of economic theory on the problems of post-Communist market economies in which necrocompanies exist.

Specifically, in the countries which are still undergoing the process of post-Communist transformation – as well as those in which post-Communist capitalism has already been established – the necroeconomy has grown on top of the roots of the command economy’s material and technical bases. We can conclude, therefore, that the necroeconomy is exactly that which differentiates the economy of post-Communist capitalism from all other models of capitalism.

The economy of post-Communist capitalism consists of the following groups of necroeconomy and vitaconomy:

- First group: necroeconomy in the public sector

International Journal of Social Economics 29, no. 9/10 (2002): 796-805. It should be mentioned, that the political science equivalent is “Necropolitics” [Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40, <http://www.jhfc.duke.edu/icuss/pdfs/Mbembe.pdf>].

20 See, for example, Peter F. Drucker, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985); M. L. Taylor, *Divesting Business Units* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1988).

21 Lipowski, *Towards Normality*, 31-2.

- Second group: vitaeconomy in the public sector
- Third group: privatised necroeconomy
- Fourth group: privatised vitaeconomy
- Fifth group: vitaeconomy developed by means of new private investments

The majority of the *first group*, as a rule, consists of large- and medium-sized processing industry enterprises (it must be taken into consideration that industry in countries with command economies has long been funded by “economising” expenditures made on agriculture, social needs, housing and transportation).²² Depending upon the types of goods produced, they are labelled “strategic” ones, even though they are dead under the conditions of a market economy owing to their lack of or low competitive powers.

On the other hand, the *second group* consists of enterprises within the energy sector (primarily, electricity generation and transmission, and the extraction and distribution of oil and gas), as well as those related to transport and communications constitute a basis for the vitaeconomy in the public sector. When privatised, they move to the *fourth group* comprising the privatised vitaeconomy which may also include some medium- although mostly small-sized industrial enterprises (prior to their privatisation).

The *third group* consists of formerly first group enterprises following their privatisation. The change in ownership by itself does not automatically entail the restarting of formerly idle enterprises in that a “corpse’s” status does not depend upon whether it is owned by the government or a private firm. Disregarding this fact is the key reason that the process of privatisation has been relatively discredited. Privatisation, especially during its initial phases – irrespective and taken separately of any investments – has often been believed to be a universal remedy capable of restarting any inoperable enterprise, dead or alive. As we will seek to demonstrate, the institute of private ownership alone is not able to create sufficient conditions for the abolition of necrofirms.

The *fifth* and last *group* embraces the “healthiest” segment of the post-Communist economy, which is based upon the principles of a market economy maintained by private investments. One of the problems discovered herein, however, is that through some foreign investments post-Communist countries receive relatively old technologies, which have become obsolete from the standpoint of modern international standards. These could be labelled as “second-hand investments” with goods manufactured by means of this capital only being competitive in “emerging markets” and only for a limited period of time until the arrival of highly competitive goods that meet all international standards.

22 Olga Vorontsova, “Strany perekhodnoi’ ekonomiki: fiskal’nye reformy na puti r rynku” [Countries with Transitional Economies: Fiscal Reforms on the Road to the Market], *Sovremennaiia Evropa* [Contemporary Europe] 4 (2009): 61.

Zombie-Economy: The Legacy of Financial Crises

As mentioned above, necrocompanies are found within the countries of post-Communist capitalism, but the question arises whether or not this is a problem confined to transition countries alone or if these sort of enterprises also exist in developed and/or developing economies.

International experience shows that dead firms exist and successfully function in developed economies as well, with Japan being the most obvious example.²³ These insolvent and, in fact, bankrupt firms that continue to operate despite their “mortality” are commonly referred to as “zombie-firms.” The key source of sustainability for these zombie-firms²⁴ is a system of continued lending with loans granted by the so-called “zombie-banks” which extend beneficial credits to the firms (in particular, interest rates for such loans are lower than average rates at market level).²⁵ In full risk of stating the obvious, these unreasonable loans can only lead these banks to direct and inevitable losses.²⁶ If, therefore, this is the maintenance plan for zombie-firms, how, one may ask, do zombie-banks manage to survive under such circumstances? As a rule, such banks receive, amongst other things, all kinds of governmental guarantees and reassurances for their deposits²⁷ at the expense of taxpayers.²⁸ To a certain degree, such a financial system even encourages “healthy” firms to turn into zombies.²⁹

As a result of the aforementioned relationship between zombie-firms, zombie-banks and their governments, a “zombie-economy” becomes a heavy burden for the “healthy” segments of the economy. In particular, the mere existence of zombie-firms that enjoy guaranteed beneficial loans from zombie-banks block the emergence of new, “healthy” firms in the market³⁰ as they

23 Takeo Hoshi, “Economics of the Living Dead,” *The Japanese Economic Review* 57, no. 1 (2006): 30-49.

24 Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi and Anil K. Kashyap, “Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 5 (2008): 1943-77, <http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/3770>; David C. Smith, “Loans to Japanese Borrowers,” *Japanese International Economies* 17, no. 3 (2003): 283-304.

25 Takeo Hoshi and Anil K. Kashyap, “Solutions to Japan’s Banking Problems: What Might Work and What Definitely Will Fail,” in *Reviving Japan’s Economy: Problems and Prescriptions*, ed. Takatoshi Ito, Hugh Patrick and David E. Weinstein (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 147-95; Smith, “Loans to Japanese Borrowers.”

26 Alan G. Ahearne and Naoki Shinada, “Zombie firms and economic stagnation in Japan,” *International Economics and Economic Policy* 2, no. 4 (2005): 363.

27 Edward J. Kane, “The Dialectical Role of Information and Disinformation in Regulation-Induced Banking Crises,” *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal* 8, no. 3/4 (2000): 301.

28 Edward J. Kane, “Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis,” *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal* 8, no. 2 (2000): 164.

29 Hoshi, “Economics of the Living Dead,” 40.

30 *Ibid.*, 33.

have to borrow at rather higher interest rates.³¹ In addition, due to their access to guaranteed beneficial loans, zombie-firms fight for market shares, have the liberty to drop prices³² and raise the salaries of their employees.³³ The limited market access for “healthy” and, even more so, productive firms eventually leads to the reduced productivity of the whole economy.³⁴

A zombie-economy takes its roots in times of financial crisis.³⁵ Under conditions of stagnation, the economy is characterised by low production and trade for a relatively long period of time which, in turn, gives rise to unemployment, a reduction in wages and salaries and the overall decline of living standards. During these times, governments, as a rule, are called to assist the economy to overcome such harsh conditions through the provision of bailouts and other attempts that could support the banking sector (in order to avoid a banking crisis) and the entire economy. When a financial crisis comes to an end, the economy receives its own lifeless portion as a legacy of the difficulties and continues to try to preserve the old system of the government’s financial aid which was readily available to it during the crisis. A zombie-economy, therefore, can be viewed as a legacy of a financial crisis.

It must be emphasised that, as international experience has shown, a zombie-economy is a phenomenon peculiar not only to Japan and other developed market economies³⁶ but also to countries with developing economies.³⁷ One might have the impression that the terms necro-economy and zombie-economy refer to the same phenomenon; that is, a dead economy which continues to subsist despite its status. In fact, such an impression is both superficial and misleading in that whilst the two “economies” do indeed share one commonality – there is no doubt that they are both dead – significant differences exist between them.

- i) Both economies develop in essentially different economic systems; a necroeconomy in a command economy whilst a zombie-economy in a market economy.

31 Ricardo Caballero and Anil K. Kashyap, “Japan’s Indian Summer,” *Wall Street Journal*, 18 July 2002, <http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/anil.kashyap/research/awsj.pdf>.

32 Smith, “Loans to Japanese Borrowers,” 288.

33 Hoshi, “Economics of the Living Dead,” 33.

34 Ahearne and Shinada, “Zombie firms and economic stagnation in Japan,” 364.

35 Ibid.; Takeo Hoshi and Anil K. Kashyap, “Japan’s Economic and Financial Crisis: An Overview,” Forthcoming at *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* (Winter 2004), 24 November 2003, draft, <http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/anil.kashyap/research/japancrisis.pdf>.

36 See, for example, Peter Holle, “The Evolution of a Zombie Economy,” *Policy Notes* (Winnipeg: The Frontier Centre for Public Policy, 15 March 2005), http://www.fcpc.org/main/publication_detail.php?PubID=979.

37 See, for example, Kane, “Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis.”

- ii) A necroeconomy, in fact, has no correlation with a financial crisis, whereas a zombie-economy is the immediate product of it. It is important to note once again that the existence of zombie-firms mainly depends upon zombie-banks, while necroeconomic agents subsist by means of immediate and direct subsidies from national budgets or tax exemptions.
- iii) The differences between a necroeconomy and a zombie-economy also have to do with the sectors that they influence. A necroeconomy, therefore, generally expands to large- and medium-sized manufacturing industries as opposed to zombie-firms which show no traces of existence therein as evidenced by the situation in Japan's economy.³⁸ Moreover, there is a higher probability for large manufacturing enterprises in a post-Communist capitalist country to become part of a necroeconomy. As the Japanese experience demonstrates, most large-sized firms, due to their great financial power, are not zombie-firms, but may also often be encountered in those so-called small businesses that are relatively "larger" than others.³⁹

It is important to note that whilst all international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, insist that the post-Communist capitalist governments should eliminate all kinds of national budget subsidies and tax exemptions, all lobbying efforts are mobilised towards pushing those bailout programmes into providing some extensive financial support to the national governments in order to enable them to build up some favourable lending systems in the context of the financial crisis.⁴⁰ Therefore, one may arrive at the conclusion that even though necroeconomies and zombie-economies are related to each other, they still differ to a great extent as individual economic phenomena. Unfortunately, however, these differences are not always given proper consideration. In some studies, the peculiarities of a necroeconomy are overlooked and, as a result the problems of dead firms in the post-Communist countries (mostly China⁴¹ and Russia) are examined within the context of zombie-economies rather than necroeconomies.⁴²

38 Hoshi, "Economics of the Living Dead."

39 Ibid.

40 Kane, "Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis," 163; Kane, "The Dialectical Role of Information and Disinformation in Regulation-Induced Banking Crises," 288.

41 Despite its Communist ruling party, China's market reforms fit more within the group of post-Communist market economies and, as such, enable us to call it a post-Communist entity.

42 See, for example, Kane, "The Dialectical Role of Information and Disinformation in Regulation-Induced Banking Crises," 300-1; Brink Lindsey, *Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 126, 153; Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, *Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 106-7.

The Human Factor and Reproductive Mechanisms of a Necroeconomy and a Zombie-Economy

A key question with respect to a necroeconomy and a zombie-economy is what ensures their stable existence. The answer may be found in an evolutionary theory of economic changes⁴³ wherein the basic tool is the concept of “routine” which implies a certain set of rules and procedures of a firm’s specific type of conduct that regulates the reproduction of this type of conduct,⁴⁴ or which refer to a repetitive pattern of activity in an entire organisation.⁴⁵ It is this very routine – developed over a period of several decades upon the roots of a command economy – that pushes dead companies in the countries of post-Communist capitalism to work in the no-longer-existing regime of a command economy. Without any special governmental support the warehouses of these companies become filled with uncompetitive goods for which there is neither demand nor a market. Given the fact that as a matter of principle these goods cannot be sold to anyone, the companies find themselves further and further in arrears as regards wages, salaries and debts to national budgets, social funds, energy sector industries and other businesses eventually creating a network of mutually indebted businesses.⁴⁶

It was a long-established tradition in command economies that when an enterprise accumulated – often very deliberately – huge debts, its director raised the question before his country’s superior governmental institutions (such as Communist Party governing bodies, the Gosplan,⁴⁷ the Ministry of Finance, etc.) to write off the debts and, as a rule, such requests were usually granted. Consequently, due to the almost unlimited (or much rather guaranteed) opportunities to have one’s own debts removed, enterprise managers did not regard debt accumulation dangerous for their existence. Such a mechanism of writing-off debts represented a firmly established routine which, unfortunately, reappears constantly and within various forms, such as “tax amnesties,” in the countries of post-Communist capitalism.⁴⁸

43 Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982).

44 Peter Murrell, “Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reform of the Centrally Planned Economies,” in *The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe*, ed. Cristopher Clague and Gordon C. Rausser (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 35-53; Peter Murrell, “Evolutionary and Radical Approaches to Economic Reform,” *Economics of Planning* 25, no. 1 (1992): 79-95.

45 Nelson and Winter, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change*, 97.

46 For example, Anders Åslund, *How Russia Became a Market Economy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 207-14; Anders Åslund, *Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 244-8, 328-30, 333-4; Åslund, *How Capitalism Was Built*, 132-3.

47 The Gosplan was the most important organisation in the USSR’s economic administration system, responsible mainly for the government’s economic planning.

48 For example, I. Nikolaev, “Perspektivy nalogovoi amnistii v Rossii” [Perspectives of Tax Amnesties in Russia], *Obshchestvo i ekonomika* [Society and Economy] 6 (2002): 49-67; I. Shul’ga, “Opyt nalogovoi amnistii

As for the “routine” of a zombie-economy, it develops under the conditions of financial crises wherein governments and banks collaborate with each other towards developing and implementing bailout programmes for insolvent firms and, thereby, avoiding greater economic decline and unemployment. During a relatively long period of stagnation, such collaboration grows into an established order that sets the rules of a firm’s conduct and, in turn, ensures its reproduction. In other words, the activities grow into a routine. Herein one must underline the continued stagnation that precedes the formation of routine; that is, it must have enough time to take hold. When a financial crisis comes to an end, the routine undertakes the mission to ensure the subsistence of a zombie-economy. The reason is that under all other equal conditions, and irrespective of the crisis, no government would tolerate the growth of unemployment which comes as an inevitable result of the closure of zombie-firms. Undoubtedly, “healthy” firms are never able to instantaneously react to the disappearance of zombie-firms and quickly address the problem of creating new jobs.⁴⁹

A necroeconomy has such a negative influence over the countries of post-Communist capitalism that the development and utilisation of a mechanism which would solve the problem of necro-firms is necessary. This mechanism must enable the universal dissemination of the market-based principles of economic order. The key to the solution of this problem rests in the abovementioned evolutionary theory of economic changes.

Governments must pay particular attention to the fifth group of the abovementioned list of firms – those within a vitaeconomy developed by means of new private investments – within post-Communist capitalist economies. They must provide for the further strengthening and expansion of this group as well as for the development of a stable political and macroeconomic environment that will encourage private investments and the emergence of new healthy firms. Account must also be taken that routine formed in this group will be one which is market-based by its nature and, therefore, the community will not be exposed to any necroeconomic danger.

The narrowing of the areas of expansion of the first and third groups on the list – that is, necroeconomy in the public sector and privatised necroeconomy – must become a key priority for the economic policy of post-Communist governments. This process must come from the overall expansion of a vitaeconomy created through the inflow of new private investments. Despite the natural non-attractiveness of such firms which become established through so-called “second-hand investments,” they will not be able to create the necessary conditions for the emergence of necroeconomic agents under the conditions of an appropriate legal framework. Specifically, to the extent that such firms were created according to the principles of a vitaeconomy, their re-

v Kazakhstan” [Experience of Tax Amnesty in Kazakhstan], *Obshchestvo i ekonomika [Society and Economy]* 6 (2002): 69-71.

49 See, for example, Caballero and Kashyap, “Japan’s Indian Summer,” *Wall Street Journal*, 18 July 2002; Lindsey, *Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism*, 235.

spective routine must ensure their painless disappearance from the market even if they have lost their competitive qualities.

With regard to the list's second and fourth groups – a viteconomy in the public sector and a privatised viteconomy and irrespective of whether or not the owner is the state or a private individual after its sale – these economies will inevitably be in need of more investments which would be attracted through a partial sale of assets or, in the very least, the long-term concession of a company's management to a strategic investor. Without these inflows, there is a strong probability that the viteconomies of the second and fourth groups will correspondingly turn into the same necroeconomies of the first and third groups.

As previously noted, privatisation alone does not result in the automatic elimination of a necroeconomy. Consequently, a government may have only one solution for solving the problem of ensuring the operation of the strategically important enterprises of the first group; that is, holding an open international tender with the purpose of choosing a strategic investor which may take over the management of a specific dead enterprise (or, much rather, obtain the right to start some strategically and domestically important production within it) upon a long-term basis. It should not be excluded that this step might not satisfy a strategic investor in which case the government would have to agree to privatise the enterprise even at a symbolic price given that a necroenterprise can naturally not be sold for a high price.

There is literally no future for the enterprises in the third group; that is, within a privatised necroeconomy whose only fair estimation of their material and technical base would be nothing more than scrap metal.

Theoretically, it must be made clear that the effective elimination of a necroeconomy is unthinkable without an effective bankruptcy law. As the experience of many countries of post-Communist capitalism has demonstrated, most attempts in the past to formally adopt bankruptcy laws have unfortunately produced only "stillborn babies."⁵⁰ In other words, they are "necro-laws" because the occurrence of factually bankrupt enterprises being proclaimed as legally bankrupt is something which happens only very seldom, if at all. In these countries, bankruptcy procedures are blocked by all possible means which, inter alia, may be explained by the assumption that bankruptcy does not "fit" into their institutional environments.

The "outsider" countries carry the heavy burden of a necroeconomy. At the same time, they provide infamous examples of the ineffectiveness of a post-Communist bankruptcy law in which new institutions are very often created through the immediate and shallow imitation of their

50 Antonio Sánchez-Andrés and José M. March-Poquet, "The Construction of Market Institutions in Russia: A View from the Institutionalism of Polanyi," *Journal of Economic Issues* XXXVI, no. 3 (2002): 1-16.

Western originals.⁵¹ As a result, many institutions of a developed market economy are often extremely ineffective in the countries of post-Communist capitalism. Moreover, they may also lead to some extremely negative consequences such as, for example, the frequent and deserved criticisms lodged against the IMF for its hasty and even simplified approaches towards institutional reforms in post-Communist countries which have ultimately harmed – rather than helped – the process of the establishment of a market economy.⁵²

The elimination of a necroeconomy may only be accomplished by establishing institutions⁵³ that will boost the process of democratic reform and raise the efficiency of post-Communist transformation.⁵⁴ The dying out of the phenomenon of a necroeconomy may be considered as an economic indicator of a country's successful overcoming of the stage of post-Communist capitalism.

An effective bankruptcy law is another effective tool in the fight against zombie-firms and zombie-banks. Unfortunately, however, one has to admit that the situation in developed and developing countries is no better than it is in the countries of post-Communist capitalism.⁵⁵ Specifically, there is a clearly observed tendency that the legitimate bankruptcy of many firms is not readily documented by means of appropriate legal procedures.⁵⁶ At the same time, the European Commission makes efforts to improve the bankruptcy environment and wants to encourage those that go bankrupt to try again.⁵⁷

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- 51 B. Shavans and E. Manian, "Postsotsialisticheskie traektorii i zapadnyi kapitalizm" [Post-Socialist Trajectories and Western Capitalism], *Mirovaia ekonomika i vvezhdunarodnye otnoshenia* [World Economy and International Relations] 12 (1999): 42-6.
- 52 Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition" (paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 1999), in *Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank: The Rebel Within*, ed. Ha-Joon Chang (London: Anthem Press, 2001), 127-71.
- 53 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).
- 54 Paul G. Hare and Junior R. Davis, "Institutions and Development: What We (Think We) Know, What We Would Like to Know," *IPPG Discussion Paper Series*, no. 3 (Edinburgh: Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, April 2006), <http://www.sml.hw.ac.uk/cert/wpa/2006/dp0603.pdf>.
- 55 Dimitar Chobanov, "Measures against the Crisis," *Economic Policy Review* 4, no. 67 (October 2008), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/measures-against-the-crisis/>; Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Ashoka Mody, eds., *Resolution of Financial Distress: An International Perspective on the Design of Bankruptcy Laws* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001); Julie Guard and Wayne Antony, eds., *Bankruptcies & Bailouts* (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2009); Metodi V. Metodiev, "The Idea of Effective Bankruptcy," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 70 (February 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/the-idea-of-effective-bankruptcy/>.
- 56 For example, Mark P. Cussen, "Changing the Face of Bankruptcy," *Investopedia*, 2008, <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/08/bankruptcy-act.asp>.
- 57 See, for example, Cornelia Nițu, "Optimal Financial Structure, Bankruptcy Risk and the Right to a New Beginning," *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 9 (2009): 270, <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aio/fpvf/v1y2009i9p267-272.html>.

The human factor, as a rule, is a matter of decisive importance for practically all kinds of economic developments. At the same time, an economic approach, as such, may be applied to any spheres of human behaviour.⁵⁸

The routine which reproduces a necroeconomy is conditioned by the behaviour of a human being who is in the middle of the transition from the state of a *homo etaticus*⁵⁹ or *homo soveticus*⁶⁰ – that is, one who is suppressed by the state and who totally depends upon it – to *homo economicus*⁶¹ or a human being whose driving force is to get a household's maximum utility and a firm's maximum profit which is typical of a market economy.

The type of human being who manages the process of post-Communist transformation or, in other words, one who is a "central character" in post-Communist capitalism is someone we call *homo transformaticus*; that is, a human being who failed to completely release himself from both the fear of the state and the habit of living at the government's expense even though he gradually gets used to the situation owing to his private interest in obtaining maximum utility and profit.⁶²

By analogy with Y. A. Levada's concept of *homo adapticus*,⁶³ *homo transformaticus* is a human being who gradually becomes accustomed to the imminent rules of a market economy and, furthermore, gets involved in the process of setting and developing those rules.

Because of the fact that the Communist regimes in "leader" countries ruled almost half as long as in the "outsider" countries, the type of person called *homo soveticus* did not have time to de-

58 Gary S. Becker, *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976).

59 Sari Hanhinen, *Social Problems in Transition: Perceptions of Influential Groups in Estonia, Russia, and Finland* (London: Aleksanteri Institute, 2000), 224, <http://books.google.com/books?id=RAzoAAAAIAAJ&q=homo+etaticus&dq=homo+etaticus&pgis=1>.

60 A. V. Buzgalin, *Perekhodnaia ekonomika: kurs lektsii po politicheskoi ekonomii* [Transitional Economy: A Course of Lectures in Political Economy] (Moscow: Taurus, 1994), 250-3.

61 The modern understanding of the features of the *homo economicus* has undergone significant changes in the aftermath of Smith's epoch (see, for example, V. S. Avtonomov, *Model' cheloveka v ekonomicheskoi nauke* [Human Model in Economic Science] (St. Petersburg: Ekonomicheskaiia shkola, 1998), 57-201; M. K. Bunkina and A. M. Semionov, *Ekonomicheskii chelovek* [The Economic Man] (Moscow: Delo, 2000).

62 Vladimer Papava, "The Georgian Economy from 'Shock Therapy' to 'Social Promotion,'" *Communist Economies & Economic Transformation* 8, no. 8 (1996): 251-67; Vladimer Papava, "The Georgian Economy: Main Directions and Initial Results of Reforms," in *Systemic Change in Post-Communist Economies*, ed. Paul G. Hare (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 281-3.

63 Y. A. Levada, "Chelovek prisposoblennyi" [Homo Adapticus], *Monitoring Public Opinion: Economic and Social Changes* 5, no. 43 (September-October 1999), <http://www.ecsocman.edu.ru/images/pubs/2006/12/02/0000296966/02levada-7-17.pdf>.

velop fully. At the same time, *homo economicus* was not totally eradicated as this phenomenon took place in the “outsider” countries at the end of the 1930s. Consequently, in the “outsider” countries *homo transformaticus* was dominated by the characteristic features of *homo soveticus*; by contrast, in the “leader” countries, it was the features of *homo economicus* which prevailed. It is precisely this difference which explains the greater readiness of *homo transformaticus* in the “leader” countries to undertake the transition to a market in contrast to the situation in the “outsider” countries.

Albania and Serbia (along with some other countries of the former Yugoslavia) seemingly make certain exceptions to the explanation given for grouping “leader” and “outsider” countries. Actually, both Albania and Serbia have specific characteristics. In the case of Albania, for example, it was distinguished with the most brutality and autarky⁶⁴ – even though the Communist regime was established there after the Second World War – which facilitated the creation of *homo soveticus* within a relatively shorter period of time. As for Serbia, the country falls under the group of so-called “outsider” countries primarily due to the fact that Serbia struggled for a rather long period after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in order to retain its former “empire” even in its diminished format. This significantly hampered a purposeful implementation of the reforms. The soundness of this provision is confirmed by the examples of former Yugoslav countries such as Slovenia and Croatia. After gaining independence, they managed to overcome the problems related to their territorial integrity relatively quickly and, now, Slovenia is a member of the EU and Croatia is candidate country for EU membership.

In business, *homo transformaticus* assumes a special form whose roots may be traced back to a command economy. Even in the times of a command economy’s reign, a market economy (or, much rather, certain elements of it) was not eradicated in its entirety. Simply, it was oppressed by the state to the degree that it could only subsist within a “shadow” sector.⁶⁵ Under the conditions of a command economy, no director (perhaps with few exceptions) could possibly manage his enterprise without breaking a law adopted by the existing regime. In exceptional cases, therefore, elements of a market economy were actually applied. Such activities were referred to as “shadow activities” and the managers of such enterprises were called “shadowists.”⁶⁶ Nevertheless, under the conditions of a command economy and given their suppression by the former Communist regime, such directors never became – and could not have possibly become –

64 See, for example, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, eds., *Albania: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994), <http://countrystudies.us/albania/34.htm>.

65 See, for example, A. N. Shokhin, *Sotsial'nyeproblemy perestroiki* [Social Problems of Perestroika] (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1989), 57-83. It must be noted that unlike a command economy, whose “shadow” sector may make room for some elements of a market economy, the “shadow” sector primarily embraces such activities which enable tax evasion [see, for example, Bunkina and Semionov, *Ekonomicheskii chelovek*, 50-52; Bo Svensson, *Economisk kriminalitet* (Göteborg: Tholin/Larsson/Gruppen förlag, 1983)].

66 A. I. Samsin, *Osnovy filosofii ekonomiki* [Basics of Economic Philosophy] (Moscow: Iuniti, 2003), 184.

truly market-type entrepreneurs. For this reason, the directors that applied some elements of the market economy within their managerial practices were not called “entrepreneurs”⁶⁷ but, rather, “*del'tsy*” (the plural of the Russian word “*delets*” which means “businessman” in its literal translation, but is typically rendered as “labourer” given its derogatory connotation).

Even after the collapse of a command economy, most of former *del'tsy* managed to preserve themselves as directors in public sector enterprises within various capacities.⁶⁸ Moreover, after the privatisation of those particular enterprises, the same *del'tsy* exploited the rights of “labourers’ collectives” and became the owners of the same enterprises.⁶⁹ At the same time, whether or not they hired professional managers – especially in the initial phases of the post-privatisation periods – they still tried to manage their enterprises according to their judgement, following a so-called *delets* way.⁷⁰

Just as *homo transformaticus* has not yet become *homo economicus*, so is the case with the former *del'tsy* that have not yet developed into entrepreneurs. *Homo transformaticus*, therefore, takes on the title of “post-*delets*”⁷¹ in his entrepreneurship.

It is exactly these post-*del'tsy* who make up the spine of a necroeconomy in both the public and private sectors as they are the carriers of the routine of a command economy. By using their old connections, the post-*del'tsy* manage to break into governmental organs (parliaments, executive offices, etc.) and use their influence to try to politically justify and prolong the existence of the necroeconomy.

It can be stated without any reservation that a necroeconomy best serves the interests of the post-*del'tsy* in that this type of economy will always enable the continuation of their existence

67 G. K. Gins, *Predprinimatel'* [The Entrepreneur] (Frankfurt am Main: Posev, 1992), 119.

68 Anders Åslund, *Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed* (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 137-40.

69 Anders Åslund, “‘Rentoorienirovannoe povedenie’ v rossiiskoi perekhodnoi ekonomike” [‘Rent-oriented Behavior’ in Russian Transitional Economy], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 8 (1996): 99-108.

70 For example, A. Nekipelov, “Problemy upravleniia ekonomikoi v transformiruемом obshchestve” [Problems of Economic Management in a Transformed Economy], in *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie modeli v sovremennom mire i put' Rossii, kniga 1: Transformatsia postsotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* [Social-Economic Models in the Modern World and Russia's Way, Vol. 1: Transformation of Post-Socialist Society], ed. K. I. Mikulski (Moscow: Ekonomika, 2003), 127.

71 The original Russian-language variant is retained here owing to the exclusively Soviet nature of this phenomenon. Vladimer Papava and Nodari Khaduri, “On the Shadow Political Economy of the Post-Communist Transformation: An Institutional Analysis,” *Problems of Economic Transition* 40, no. 6 (1997): 15-34.

until they are entirely replaced by true entrepreneurs through the means of appropriate institutional reforms.

The key to understanding a zombie economy's routine may be found in the theory of public choice by James Buchanan in which politics is interpreted as a special type of a market.⁷² During a financial crisis, a type of economic policy develops that proposes the government's interference in the economy with its uppermost goal of rescuing it from a critical state, on the one hand, and encourages the addressing of the private interests of those economic agents who have found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy as a result of the said crisis, on the other hand.

As previously mentioned, a zombie-economy's routine is the product of a market economy in a state of crisis. Consequently, it is not a simple *homo economicus* who is the carrier of this routine but, rather said, a mutation which was formed in the process of his adaptation to the deformed conditions of the market economy as a result of the financial crisis. Conventionally, a *homo economicus* mutant may be called *zombie economicus*⁷³ in that he is the carrier of a zombie-economy's routine.

From *zombie economicus*, as an already accomplished phenomenon, *homo transformaticus* differs by the fact that he is still in the process of adaptation to a market economy and, as such, he has not yet been established as a type of human being. Because *homo transformaticus* is still developing, one may ask whether or not it is possible for a *homo transformaticus* to grow into a *zombie economicus* in the context of the ongoing global financial crisis.

The Current Financial Crisis and the Threat of Zombie-ing the Necroeconomy

The complex problems created by the current global economic and financial crisis⁷⁴ could not leave the countries of post-Communist capitalism unaffected. It is precisely within this context that the attack of zombie-firms upon the global economy has become so topical an issue,⁷⁵ re-

72 James M. Buchanan, "The Constitution of Economic Policy," *American Economic Review* 77, no. 3 (1987): 243-50.

73 Vladimer Papava, "Is Zombie Economicus Coming?" *Market Oracle*, 7 February 2009, <http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article8736.html>.

74 John Stepek, "How Zombie Companies Suck the Life from an Economy," *MoneyWeek*, 18 November 2008, <http://www.moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/how-zombie-companies-suck-the-life-from-an-economy-14089.aspx>; Jim Willie CB, "U.S. Economy Disintegrating as Government Supports Zombie Banks," *Market Oracle*, 4 December 2008, <http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article7619.html>.

75 For example, George Cooper, *The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008); Harry S. Dent Jr., *The Great Depression Ahead: How to*

sulting in the emergence of numerous studies within the so-called new economic field of “zombie-nomics.”⁷⁶ As many developed countries nowadays resort to certain special governmental bailout programmes in support of their financial institutions and real estate businesses,⁷⁷ the threat of a new zombie-economic routine arises; a threat that may become real if the financial crisis continues long enough to enable the zombie-economic routine to establish itself.

If only a few years ago the existence of a zombie-economy in the United States of America (US) was categorically negated,⁷⁸ nowadays talk about the emergence of zombie-firms as a direct result of the financial crisis has grown louder.⁷⁹ As a consequence, the US government’s bailout plan has been referred to as a zombie-programme, whereas the US Treasury Department has been disparagingly called the “mother” of a zombie-economy.⁸⁰ To be fair, however, one has to underline that the first signs of the zombie-ing of the US banking sector appeared long before the beginning of the present financial crisis, when the US government extended subsidies to American banks in order to stimulate their mortgage lending insurance plans for the benefit of

Prosper in the Crash Following the Greatest Boom in History (New York: Free Press, 2008); Paul Krugman, *The Return of Depress on Economics and the Crisis of 2008* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008); Robert J. Shiller, *The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Benn Steil, *Lessons of the Financial Crisis*, Council Special Report no. 45 (New York: Center for Geoeconomic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2009); Paola Subacchi and Alexei Monsarrat, eds., *New Ideas for the London Summit. Recommendations to the G20 Leaders* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009); Mark Zandi, *Financial Shock: A 3600 Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion, and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis* (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 2009).

- 76 Lelei LeLaulu, “Zombie Economics?” *The Development Executive Group*, 13 January 2009, <http://www.devex.com/articles/zombie-economics>.
- 77 V. Mau, “Drama 2008 goda: ot ekonomicheskogo chyda k ekonomicheskomu krizisu” [2008 Drama: From the Economic Miracle to the Economic Crisis], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 2 (2009): 22-23.
- 78 William Bonner and Addison Wiggin, *Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft Depression of the 21st Century* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 120. Higher officials are ignoring the problem of the existence of zombie institutions in the US financial system; see Paul Krugman, “The Big Dither,” *New York Times*, 5 March 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/opinion/06krugman.html>.
- 79 Peter Coy, “A New Menace to the Economy: ‘Zombie’ Debtors,” *BusinessWeek*, 15 January 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_04/b4117024316675.htm; Paul Krugman, “Wall Street Voodoo,” *New York Times*, 18 January 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/opinion/19krugman.html?_r=2&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; William Pesek, “Jay Leno Tells Asia about Detroit’s Zombies,” *Livemint.com*, *Wall Street Journal*, 17 November 2008, <http://www.livemint.com/2008/11/17233803/Jay-Leno-tells-Asia-about-Detr.html>; Lila Rajiva, “Nightmare on Wall Street,” *LewRockwell.com*, 1 April 2009, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/rajiva/rajiva16.html>; Tony Wong, “Can U.S. Escape Zombie Economy’s Clutch?” *TheStar.com*, *Toronto Star*, 4 October 2008, <http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/511664>.
- 80 James Howard Kunstler, “The Inevitable Fate of Our ‘Zombie’ Economy,” *Contrarian Stock Market Investing News*, 28 November 2008, <http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/the-inevitable-fate-of-our-zombie-economy/9233>.

low income segments of the population which failed to meet general banking standards.⁸¹ Remarkably, experts assert that an interesting difference exists between the emergence mechanisms of zombie-firms in Japan and those in the US. In the first case, for example, the government supports zombie-firms through zombie-banks, whereas the bailout plans envisaged in the US are intended to be implemented without the mediation of banks, even though the results in both countries are expected to be the same.⁸² Obviously, such an approach does not correspond to the reality which is being shaped in the US in relation to its government's domestic zombie-banks' bailout programme.⁸³

Likewise, the rise of a zombie-economy in Canada⁸⁴ and some EU countries⁸⁵ has become a possibility. In the countries of post-Communist capitalism, the present financial crisis favours the development of governmental programmes aimed at providing financial support to perishing banks and firms.⁸⁶ Various proposals have been put forth which would establish some special governmental institutions (banks) and implement long-term beneficial lending and investing.⁸⁷

Although the economic theory has stood the test of time and global experience has also shown just how harmful governmental interventions into the economy can be when favourable lending plans – as well as subsidies to troubled industries, or the raising of the trade barriers – are introduced,⁸⁸ both developed economies and those of post-Communist capitalism repeatedly re-

81 Steven A. Holmes, "Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending," *New York Times*, 30 September 1999, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=c0de7db153ef933a0575ac0a96f958260&sec=&spn=&pagewanted=all>.

82 Takeo Hoshi, "Year of the Zombie," *RGE Asia EconoMonitor*, 21 January 2009, http://www.rgemonitor.com/asia-monitor/255220/year_of_the_zombie.

83 Jim Willie CB, "U.S. Economy Disintegrating as Government Supports Zombie Banks," *Market Oracle*, 4 December 2008, <http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article7619.html>.

84 Finn Poschmann, "Beware of Zombies," *Financial Post*, 26 January 2009, <http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpcomment/archive/2009/01/26/beware-of-zombies.aspx>

85 Morgan Kelly, "Bank Guarantee Likely to Deal a Crippling Blow to the Economy," *Irish Times*, 17 February 2009, <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2009/0217/1224241278003.html>; Frank Schnittger, "Ireland's Zombie Economy," *European Tribune*, 14 January 2009, <http://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory;sid=2009/1/14/113437/798>.

86 See, for example, Andrei Illarionov, "Priroda rossiiskogo krizisa" [The Nature of Russian Crisis] (Moscow: Institute of Economic Analysis, 2 October 2008), <http://www.iea.ru/macroeconom.php?id=8>.

87 Bogdan Danilishin, "Ekonomika Ukrainy: zhizn' posle krizisa" [Ukraine's Economy: A Life after Crisis?], *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 17-23 January 2009, <http://www.zn.ua/2000/2020/65131/>.

88 Ioan Talpoş et al., "A Retrospective View on the Relationship between Fiscal Policy and Economic Crisis," *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 9 (2009): 30, <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aio/fpvf/v1y2009i9p27-31.html>.

sort to the aforementioned remedy during a financial crisis.⁸⁹ Unfortunately, however, as mentioned earlier, such a move eventually leads to the emergence of a zombie-economy routine.

The current financial crisis brings the principle of “privatisation of profits and nationalisation of losses” to the surface.⁹⁰ During a financial crisis, developed economies are more vulnerable to the zombie-ing of the economy, compared to the countries of post-Communist capitalism, owing to the latter’s exposure to the necroeconomy.⁹¹ Under normal circumstances, post-Communist countries with a large-scale market experience the effects of a necroeconomy far less than those with relatively smaller ones. The reason for this is that large-scale markets create fertile ground for competition and governmental support,⁹² a combination that evokes the illusion that a necroeconomy does not exist. In smaller countries, however, this problem is rather severe due to the fact that many enterprises may have no domestic competitors at all.⁹³

This difference between large and small markets has an influence upon the governmental policies supporting a necroeconomy. In particular, the illusion of the absence of a necroeconomy caused by domestic competition hinders, to a large extent, a government’s will to get rid of a necroeconomy. In countries with small-scale markets, however, the absence of analogous enterprises eliminates the conditions for domestic competition, thus enabling the governments to retain a greater stimulus to fight necroeconomy, even though such a stimulus is not always utilised in a proper way.

Amid a financial crisis, the governments of post-Communist capitalist countries may retain far less illusions that a necroeconomy exists. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that they witness a catastrophic decrease in their industrial output.

In view of the fact that it is precisely the financial crisis which creates favourable conditions for the establishment of zombie-economy routines – that is, the zombie-ing of an economy – the zombie-ing of a necroeconomy is what happens in the countries of post-Communist capitalism. It, in fact, is even worse than the simple economic zombie-ing which takes place in developed

89 Thomas E. Woods Jr., *Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2009).

90 Mau, “Drama 2008 goda,” 10.

91 Vladimer Papava, “Problema zombirovania postkommunisticheskoi’ nekroekonomiki” [Zombification of the Post-Communist Necroeconomy], *Vestnik instituta Kennana v Rossii* [Kennan Institute Bulletin in Russia] 15 (2009): 37-48.

92 See, for example, Mark Schaffer and Boris Kuznetsov, “Productivity,” in *Can Russia Compete?* ed. Raj M. Desai and Itzhak Goldberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 12-34.

93 Vladimer Papava and Micheil Tokmazishvili, “Necroeconomic Foundations and the Development of Business in Post-Revolution Georgia,” *Caucasus & Globalization* 1, no. 4 (2007): 84-95.

economies. If in Japan, for example, the zombie-economy never touched the processing industries, then one of the qualities of the necroeconomy is to concentrate exactly upon this sector of the economy. Consequently, the zombie-ing of a necroeconomy inevitably amounts to the zombie-ing of this already dead sector as well.

Therefore, there is high probability that *homo transformaticus* will eventually grow into a *zombie economicus*, rather than into a *homo economicus*. This implies that the economic future of the post-Communist capitalist countries could be even more dubious than it is today.

CHAPTER 2

THE ONGOING CRISIS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION AND THE POST-CRISIS DIFFICULTIES

On the Current Global Financial and Economic Crisis

Given the complex character of the global financial and economic crisis, this chapter does not aim to engage in its detailed discussion, but to set out some elements of the crisis that will allow for the understanding of various economic difficulties that appear today in the Black Sea Region. The first sign of the crisis appeared in the US financial system in the summer of 2007. Later, it expanded to Western Europe and Japan and reached all developing countries and economies in transition by the end of 2008.⁹⁴ The financial globalisation accelerated the spreading of the crisis worldwide.⁹⁵ The evolution of the present financial crisis can simply be described through the following chain of transformations: it started with a mortgage crisis – as it should be expected – that grew into a banking crisis, which in turn led to an industrial crisis.⁹⁶ The current financial crisis is also labelled as a demand crisis.⁹⁷ Thus, it has been transformed into an economic or financial-cum-economic crisis, which is very important to understand the economic difficulties of the Black Sea Region.⁹⁸

While the overproduction of goods and services was the key cause of the economic crises in the 20th century, there is still no common ground regarding the nature of the current crisis. According to some, the present crisis (which is also defined as a “credit crisis”) should be connected to the overproduction of debts.⁹⁹ Others suggest that the modern crisis is actually the result of the

94 See, for example, Marek Dabrowski, “Responding to Crisis: Core and Periphery,” *Development & Transition*, no. 13, July 2009, 5, http://www.developmentandtransition.net/uploads/issuesAttachments/25/DT.13_English_FINAL.pdf.

95 Cristi Spulbăr, Dorel Berceanu and Tatiana Spulbăr, “Financial Globalization – from Challenge to Crisis,” *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 8 (2008): 126-31.

96 See, for example, Ali Masimli, “Azerbaijan and the World Financial Crisis,” *The Caucasus & Globalization* 3, no. 1 (2009): 72.

97 Rita Ramalho, Jorge Rodríguez-Meza and Judy Yang, “How are Firms in Eastern and Central Europe Reacting to the Financial Crisis?” *Enterprise Surveys, Enterprise Note Series*, no. 8 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, December 2009), 1, <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/documents/EnterpriseNotes/Note8.pdf>.

98 Teodora D. Petrova, “Implications of the current financial crisis on the new EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania” (paper presented at the 7th Annual Claremont – UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union, Claremont, CA, 16-18 April 2009), 9, <http://eucenter.scrippscollege.edu/pdfs/2009%20Conference%20papers/Teodora%20Petrova.pdf>.

99 See, for example, George Soros, *The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

previous situation of an overproduction of goods and services fuelled by the expansion of “fiduciary money” and resulting in excessive supply which eventually led to the current level of consumption of goods and services at the expense of future incomes which sometimes were not received at all.¹⁰⁰

It appears that both perspectives are correct and non-contradictory, depending on the period of time under consideration. Thus, in a short-term perspective, the overproduction of debts is apparent. Specifically, the crisis was preceded by the continued financing of the growing current consumption. The financing took place through loans which were extended on the account of some future – but not always realistic and reasonable – incomes. Moreover, due to their being tied-up with consumption in the past, the future incomes can hardly be used for consumption in the corresponding period of time. As a result, the cost of goods and services to be produced in the future is higher than the buying capacity of incomes raised in the corresponding period. Therefore, in a long-term perspective the effect of the overproduction of goods and services also becomes apparent.

As far as the anti-crisis programmes are concerned, the most common include the avoidance of protectionist measures, nationalisation and expansion of the public sector,¹⁰¹ even though it is not recommended that solutions to some substantial social problems be suspended for an indefinite period of time.¹⁰²

The impact of the global financial crisis on the Black Sea Region has been felt in a different way compared to other regions, mostly due to the level of economic development or, more specifically, due to the extent of the development of its financial markets.¹⁰³ Although financial markets in the post-Communist countries are not developed, these countries could not escape from any of the negative implications of the global financial crisis.¹⁰⁴ It should also be underlined that despite the difficulties created by the global financial crisis, the financial systems in the Black Sea Region countries have not collapsed. Certainly, this can be seen as a very significant

100 Andrey Ivanov, “The Economic Crisis as a Human Development Opportunity,” *Development & Transition*, no. 13, July 2009, 22, http://www.developmentandtransition.net/uploads/issuesAttachments/25/DT.13_English_FINAL.pdf.

101 Dabrowski, “Responding to Crisis: Core and Periphery,” 5

102 Balázs Horváth, “Towards a Multifaceted Policy Response,” *Development & Transition*, no. 13, July 2009, 13-14, http://www.developmentandtransition.net/uploads/issuesAttachments/25/DT.13_English_FINAL.pdf.

103 Gavras and Iorga, “The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region.”

104 See, for example, Åslund, “Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Eastern Europe;” Dabrowski, “Responding to Crisis: Core and Periphery.”

105 Panayotis Gavras, *The Current State of Economic Development in the Black Sea Region*, Commission on the Black Sea, Policy Report I (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010), 13, http://www.bertelsmannstiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-0DEA6A1D-51BA7B29/bst_engl/xcms_bst_dms_30694_30695_2.pdf.

success story for these countries.¹⁰⁵ Further down, each of the countries in the Black Sea Region will be considered individually in order to assess the impact of the crisis. It needs to be highlighted that the statistical information in the aforementioned countries is not uniformly structured. The countries of the region, which are also members of the EU, have more reliable statistical information than most of the other states in the region. Nevertheless, the information used in this paper is provided by the national statistical offices.

The Moderate Impact of the Global Crisis on Albania

In comparison with other Black Sea Region countries, Albania was the most closed economy of the Communist past, with its statistical data being confidential and unreliable.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, against the background of the global financial crisis, the economy of Albania is quite stable and has not experienced an economic downturn yet. According to the estimates of the IMF, for instance, the annual GDP growth amounted to 6.8% in 2008 with the annual inflation rate measured at 3.4%, while the GDP was expected to increase by 0.7% in 2009 with the annual inflation rate down to 1.7%. For 2010, the GDP is expected to increase by 2.0% with inflation estimated at 2.0%.¹⁰⁷ Thus, one may conclude that there is no crisis in Albania and the country only faces an economic slowdown.¹⁰⁸ This is because Albania has been relatively less vulnerable to shocks of traditional low income countries; namely, those concerning exports, prices, remittances and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).¹⁰⁹ Albanian exports, for instance, account for just 25% of GDP. Thus, a decrease in exports owing to the global financial crisis cannot significantly influence the rate of its GDP growth,¹¹⁰ given that growth has been supported mainly by domestic demand.¹¹¹ Also, the free floating exchange rate regime in Albania allows for the lek, the country's national currency, to maintain its stability.¹¹² Although the deposits flowed out of the Albanian

106 See, for example, *Eruditsia – Rossii'skaja elektronnaia biblioteka* [Erudition – Russian Digital Library], s.v. "Ekonomika Albanii" [Economy of Albania], http://www.erudition.ru/referat/ref/id.30099_1.html (accessed 29 January 2010).

107 International Monetary Fund, *Regional Economic Outlook: Europe* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, October 2009), 6, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2009/EUR/eng/ereo1009.pdf>.

108 Ann-Margret Westin, "In Albania economic slowdown, not crisis," interview by Ragip Luta, BBC Albanian Section, 10 March 2009, <http://www.imf.org/external/country/alb/rr/2009/031009.pdf>.

109 *Ibid.*, 1.

110 *Ibid.*, 2.

111 "Statement by the Honorable Giulio Tremonti Minister of Economy and Finance, and Governor of the IMF for Italy Speaking on behalf of Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, San Marino, and Timor-Leste International Monetary and Financial Committee" (IMF International Monetary and Financial Committee Twentieth Meeting, Istanbul, 4 October 2009), 3, <http://www.imf.org/External/AM/2009/imfc/statement/eng/ita.pdf>.

112 Ardian Fullani, "Effects of the Exchange Rate Regime," *The Bank for International Settlements Review* 119/2009, 24 September 2009, 1, <http://www.bis.org/review/r091006d.pdf>.

banking system due to the global financial crisis,¹¹³ the Albanian banking system, which is predominantly foreign owned, is quite stable.¹¹⁴

It is worth noting that in 2008 experts had predicted that the global financial crisis would have a moderate impact on the Albanian economy.¹¹⁵ As the memories of the financial crisis caused by the “financial pyramids” (Ponzi scheme) in 1996-97 were still fresh in the memory of the Albanians,¹¹⁶ the global financial crisis gave rise to a latent panic amongst the population. As a result, and in order to prevent serious complications, the government decided to use a deposit insurance system that insured deposits up to 700,000 Albanian lek (approximately US\$7,000).¹¹⁷

While no economic downturn is observed in Albania, the country’s industry is in a difficult state. The third quarter of 2009, for instance, witnessed a decrease in production volume by 4.5%.¹¹⁸ This comes as no surprise, if one recalls that considerable investments and assistance were provided to the Albanian industry by the Soviet Union and other Socialist bloc countries and, since the early 1960s, by China.¹¹⁹ Thus, Albanian industry was inefficient, structurally distorted,¹²⁰

113 “Statement by the Honorable Giulio Tremonti Minister of Economy and Finance, and Governor of the IMF for Italy Speaking on behalf of Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, San Marino, and Timor-Leste International Monetary and Financial Committee” (IMF International Monetary and Financial Committee Nineteenth Meeting, Washington, D.C., 25 April 2009), 4, <http://www.imf.org/External/spring/2009/imfc/statement/eng/ita.pdf>.

114 Statement by the IMF Mission to Albania, “Press Release 09/119, 9 April 2009, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09119.htm>.

115 Jonilda Koci, “Global Economic Downturn Affects Albania’s Economy,” *Southeast European Times*, 23 December 2008, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/12/23/feature-02.

116 Christopher Jarvis, “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes,” *Finance & Development, A quarterly magazine of the IMF* 37, no. 1 (March 2000), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm#author>.

117 Sergei Zharkikh, “V Albanii nachalas’ skrytaja panika naselenija v svjazi s finansovym krizisom” [A Latent Panic of the Population in Connection with the Financial Crisis Started in Albania], *Rossii’skaja gazeta* [Russian newspaper], 27 October 2008, <http://www.rg.ru/2008/10/27/albania-krizis-anons.html> (accessed 29 January 2010).

118 INSTAT, “Quarterly Gross Domestic Product Publication of the Third Quarter of 2009” (Tiranë: Instituti i Statistikës, 2009), 4, <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/Llogarite%20Kombetare/Highlights/Quarterly%20Gross%20Domestic%20Product,%20T%20III%202009.pdf> (accessed 29 January 2010).

119 Atul Agarwal, “The Organization and Performance of Albania’s Command Economy,” *OK Economics*, http://econc10.bu.edu/economic_systems/Economics/Economic_History/Albania/echist_albania.htm (accessed 29 January 2010); *Encyclopedia of the Nations*, s.v. “Albania–Industry,” <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Albania-INDUSTRY.html> (accessed 29 January 2010); *Eruditsia – Rossii’skaja elektronnaja biblioteka* [Erudition – Russian Digital Library], s.v. “Ekonomika Albanii” [Economy of Albania], http://www.erudition.ru/referat/ref/id.30099_1.html (accessed 29 January 2010).

120 Zickel and Iwaskiw, eds., *Albania: A Country Study*.

and characterised by high resource-intensity and low productivity.¹²¹ In other words, similarly to the other post-Communist countries, a necroeconomy was created in Albania as a result of the collapse of the Communist regime.

With the current crisis, the necroeconomic plants in Albania face serious problems. An illustrative example is heavy industry where the metallurgical works continue without yielding any profit for the sole purpose of fulfilling obligations undertaken in contracts with clients from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.¹²² Taking into consideration that the Albanian government allocated US\$300 million to support the country's economy,¹²³ it is apparent that its necroeconomy faces the threat of zombie-ing.

Economic Development in Armenia

In the absence of any serious deposits of natural resources, the global financial crisis had a very serious impact upon Armenia. This country was also gravely affected by the Russian-Georgian war.¹²⁴ In particular, according to official sources, the direct and indirect damage caused to Armenia by the war is estimated to US\$600-700 million.¹²⁵

In 2008, the annual inflation rate in Armenia was 9.0% and the GDP growth rate 6.8%.¹²⁶ In January-November 2009, the GDP accounted for just 84.0% of its amount for the same period of 2008.¹²⁷ National budget revenues in the first quarter of 2009 fell almost 10% lower than 2008 levels.¹²⁸ In January-May 2009 industrial production shrank by 10.5% and construction by

121 A. Kokomani, "Osnovnye kharakteristiki ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Albanii" [Basic Characteristics of the Albanian Economic Development], *Vsehossii'skaja akademija vneshnei' torgovli* [All-Russian Academy of Foreign Trade], 2006, <http://www.vavt.ru/works/work/336353700>.

122 "Pravitel'stvo Albanii srochno dyleljaet 300 mln doll dlja snizhenija posledstviu' mirovogo finansovogo krizisa" [The Government of Albania Urgently Allocated 300 mln US\$ to Reduce the Effects of the Global Financial Crisis], *RosInvest.Com*, 25 December 2008, <http://www.rosinvest.com/news/484250/>.

123 Ibid.

124 See, for example, Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, eds., *The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009).

125 Samvel Avagyan, "The Global Financial Crises: Impact on Armenia," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (2009): 98; Haroutiun Khachatryan, "Republic of Armenia: Economy," in *Central Eurasia 2008* (Luleå: CA&CC Press, 2009), 48.

126 Ibid., 49.

127 National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, "Main Statistical Data," 2009, <http://www.arm-stat.am/en/> (accessed 29 January 2010).

128 Haroutiun Khachatryan, "Armenia: How a Small Country Counters the Global Crisis," *Caucasus Analytical Digest: The Caucasus in the Global Financial Crisis*, no. 6, 21 May 2009, 5, http://www.hertie-school.org/binaries/addon/1282_caucasus_economic_report.pdf.

56.1%.¹²⁹ According to the Central Bank and the government of Armenia, the country faced an economic decline of 6-8% in 2009.¹³⁰

The significant role played by the Armenian Diaspora in all spheres of Armenia's development, mainly in investing and rendering economic aid,¹³¹ should be particularly emphasised.¹³² Private transfers, for example, made up 15-30% of GDP in the pre-crisis period.¹³³ Attracting funds from non-residents, particularly Diaspora Armenians, into the Armenian banking sector as well as launching the All-Armenian Bank – which has the Armenian government as a major shareholder and aims at attracting the funds of Diaspora Armenians for investments in Armenia – is the main goal of the anti-crisis programme.¹³⁴ As more than 70% of Armenian migrant workers are in Russia, the crisis might force some of the Armenians living abroad (mostly in Russia) to return home, a fact that might cause an even higher rate of unemployment and, as a result, more burden on the national budget.¹³⁵ Due to the crisis, remittances from Russia dropped over 30%.¹³⁶

As expected, the crisis hit, in the first place, the country's industrial sector – the branch where the enterprises of necroeconomy are concentrated. In 2008, the production rate in the metallurgical and chemical industries fell 9.6% and 14.8% respectively, compared to 2007.¹³⁷ In this regard, it must be noted that only 98.7% of the total industrial production volume was sold in 2008 and, more remarkably, some 70% of those sales took place in the domestic market,¹³⁸ indicating the necroeconomic nature of some key sectors of the Armenian economy. Thus, the main problems in the Armenian economy are concentrated in the real sector.¹³⁹

129 See, for example, Meri Yeranosyan, "Armenia and the Tremors of the Crises," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (2009): 128.

130 Ben Aris, "Armenian Banks Suffer at Hands of Real Economy," *bne-businessneweurope*, September 2009, 49; Ben Aris, "Crisis Vindicates Central Bank's Conservative Policy," *bne-businessneweurope*, August 2009, 58.

131 See, for example, Victoria Minoian and Lev Freinkman, "Diaspora's Contribution to Armenia's Economic Development: What Drives the First Movers and How Their Efforts Could Be Scaled Up?" Knowledge for Development Program, The World Bank, 2003, <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/152388/victoriaminoian.pdf>.

132 See, for example, Gerhard J. Libaridian, *The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking since Independence* (Watertown: Blue Crane Books, 1999), 119-48.

133 Yeranosyan, "Armenia and the Tremors of the Crises," 128-9.

134 Khachatryan, "Armenia: How a small country counters the global crisis," 6.

135 *Ibid.*, 5.

136 Avagyan, "The Global Financial Crises: Impact on Armenia," 98-9.

137 Khachatryan, "Republic of Armenia: Economy," 51.

138 *Ibid.*

139 Aris, "Armenian Banks Suffer at Hands of Real Economy," 50.

In November 2008, the Armenian government came up with an anti-crisis programme which, *inter alia*, provides support for local industries through subsidising or issuing governmental guarantees to companies experiencing certain difficulties and even taking a stake in some of them.¹⁴⁰ Within this framework, more than twenty companies have already received governmental assistance in the aggregate amount of US\$67 million.¹⁴¹ Obviously, the Armenian economy is exposed to a critical danger of zombie-ing under the conditions of the global financial crisis.

Azerbaijan: Dealing Adequately with the Global Crisis

There is broad consensus among experts and international financial institutions like the IMF¹⁴² that Azerbaijan has suffered the least from the global financial crisis compared to other countries of the post-Soviet world.¹⁴³ In 2008, Azerbaijan's annual inflation rate was 20.8%¹⁴⁴ and its GDP growth rate 10.8% – the highest among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).¹⁴⁵ In this regard, it must be noted that Azerbaijan's economic growth during the same year was basically conditioned by a 7% growth in the oil sector and a 15.7% growth in the non-oil sector.¹⁴⁶

Two factors have to be taken into account in order to understand Azerbaijan's ability to cope with the global financial crisis better than any other post-Soviet country: i) the underdevelopment of its financial sector and ii) the domination of the oil and gas sector in the national economy.¹⁴⁷ The former is a typical phenomenon of practically all post-Soviet countries, although Azerbaijan is even weaker in this sector than countries like Armenia, Georgia, Russia or

140 Avagyan, "The Global Financial Crises: Impact on Armenia," 99-100; Khachatryan, "Armenia: How a small country counters the global crisis," 6.

141 *Ibid.*, 7.

142 A. Badalova, "Azerbaijan Can Withstand Global Crisis Better than Other Countries: Interview with IMF Representation Head," *TREND News Agency*, 8 April 2009, <http://en.trend.az/capital/economy/macro/1453269.html>.

143 See, for example, Gerald Hübner and Michael Jainzik, "Splendid Isolation? Azerbaijan's Economy between Crisis Resistance and Debased Performance," *Caucasus Analytical Digest: The Caucasus in the Global Financial Crisis*, no. 6, 21 May 2009, 12, http://www.hertie-school.org/binaries/addon/1282_caucasus_economic_report.pdf; Elshad Mikayilov, "The Global Economic Crises and Azerbaijan," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (2009): 102.

144 Rasim Hasanov, "Azerbaijan Republic: Economy," in *Central Eurasia 2008* (Luleå: CA&CC Press, 2009), 85.

145 See, for example, Gerai' Dadashev, "Vliyanie krizisa sredi stran SNG menee vsego oshchushchaetsia v Azerbaidzhane" [Amongst the CIS Countries the Impact of the Crisis is Least Felt in Azerbaijan], *RIA Novosti* [RIA News], 5 February 2009, <http://www.rian.ru/crisis/20090205/161073555.html>.

146 Hasanov, "Azerbaijan Republic: Economy," 84.

147 See, for example, Hübner and Jainzik, "Splendid Isolation?" 12; Badalova, "Azerbaijan Can Withstand Global Crisis Better than Other Countries."

Ukraine.¹⁴⁸ Thus, the drawback of having an underdeveloped financial sector has turned into an “advantage” for Azerbaijan during the global financial crisis, for it has lessened the adverse impact on its economy. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the loans which were attracted from foreign financial markets did not exceed 25% of all banking liabilities in Azerbaijan’s banking sector.¹⁴⁹ This explains why Azerbaijan’s relatively underdeveloped banking sector (like in Armenia and Georgia) has withstood the ongoing global financial crisis comparatively well.¹⁵⁰

The second factor – the national economy’s domination by oil and gas extracting industries – can be translated into the following figures: in 2008, their share in Azerbaijan’s GDP exceeded 60% making up 60% of all state revenues and almost 100% of all exports.¹⁵¹ Owing to the growing exports of its oil and gas, Azerbaijan secured stable inflows of significant foreign currency resources. As a result, foreign currency reserves of the National Bank of Azerbaijan grew eleven times from 2003 and reached US\$18 billion in 2008, which is 6.7 times in excess of the country’s total internal and external public debts.¹⁵² In addition, the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) has reserves of US\$11 billion for the country.¹⁵³ Although oil prices have significantly dropped due to the crisis, the country’s foreign currency reserves have alleviated its negative impacts. It is also important to note that the amount of Azerbaijan’s existing strategic currency reserves is enough to finance the country’s imports for twenty-seven consecutive months.¹⁵⁴ Among the two aforementioned factors, Azerbaijan’s foreign currency reserves due to oil and gas exports that have created a so-called “safety cushion” for the country’s economy,¹⁵⁵ is the most decisive one.

In late 2008, Azerbaijani banks had to pay off approximately US\$1 billion of external debt.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, due to the scarcity of lending resources at world markets, banks reduced their lending programmes and some of them completely stopped providing loans to Azerbaijani households and enterprises.¹⁵⁷ To maintain the national currency’s exchange rate stability, the country’s central bank spent some US\$1.2 billion to buy manats in the first four months of 2009.¹⁵⁸

148 Hübner and Jainzik, “Splendid Isolation?” 12.

149 Masimli, “Azerbaijan and the World Financial Crisis,” 76.

150 Hübner and Jainzik, “Splendid Isolation?” 14.

151 *Ibid.*, 13.

152 Hasanov, “Azerbaijan Republic: Economy,” 85.

153 Hübner and Jainzik, “Splendid Isolation?” 13.

154 Hasanov, “Azerbaijan Republic: Economy,” 91.

155 *Ibid.*

156 *Ibid.*

157 Hübner and Jainzik, “Splendid Isolation?” 14.

158 *Ibid.*, 15.

As expected, necroeconomic enterprises particularly in the steel, aluminium and chemical industries have undergone several hardships.¹⁵⁹ According to official statistics, whilst the overall growth of industrial output in Azerbaijan was up 103.9% during the first eight months of 2009 as compared to the same period in 2008, the non-oil sector has demonstrated some decline; that is, the production rate for the same period of 2009 comprised only 94.3% of the similar indicator for the same period in 2008.¹⁶⁰ Production during the first seven months of 2009 as compared to the same period in 2008 in the metallurgy industry dropped by 62%, in chemical industry by 53%, in furniture industry by 42.6%, in oil processing by 10% and in rubber and plastic materials industry by 19%.¹⁶¹

The City of Sumgayit, Azerbaijan's third largest populated city and famous for its military-industrial complex in the Soviet period, constitutes a classic example of a necroeconomic centre. Almost all of its enterprises – namely the state-owned chemical company Azerkimya plants, the state-owned Azerboru pipe factory and Azeraluminum – remain either completely idle or work at extremely low capacities.¹⁶² The same (or close to that) status is enjoyed by all steel and metal-rolling factories that were created during the years of Azerbaijan's independence; namely, the Baku Steel Company, Baki Poladtekme JSC, and DHT Metal JSC.¹⁶³

One has to bear in mind that Azerbaijan's economic management system still retains some of the old-fashioned institutional schemes such as the independent disposition by almost all state-owned large industrial and infrastructure companies of their material and financial resources, the availability for many of these companies of some large budget assignments and their privilege of enjoying some "tax holidays."¹⁶⁴

In early 2009, the government of Azerbaijan came up with a package of anti-crisis measures that included

- taking preventive measures against the artificial growth of prices on the consumer market;
- strengthening the anti-monopoly regulation of the economy;
- preventing illegal governmental interference in the economy;

159 Ibid., 13.

160 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Macroeconomic Indicators," 14 September 2009, <http://www.azstat.org/macroeconomy/indexen.php?page=3&estat=archive&topic=30>.

161 Mikayilov, "The Global Economic Crises and Azerbaijan," 109.

162 Shahin Abbasov, "Azerbaijan: Beyond Energy Exports, the Global Downturn is Battering Local Industry," *Eurasia Insight*, 27 April 2009, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav042709.shtml>.

163 Shahin Abbasov, "Azerbaijan: Global Crisis Hits Baku Banks and Real Estate Sector," *Eurasia Insight*, 1 December 2008, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav120108a.shtml>.

164 Rasim Hasanov, "Management in Transition Economies: An Azerbaijan Republic Case Study," *The Caucasus & Globalization* 3, no. 1 (2009): 89-91.

- depositing the foreign currency reserves which are kept abroad in the most reliable local banks and ensuring reliable governmental control over the investing of these resources in the real sector of economy;
- improving the government's investment policy;
- strengthening governmental control over the spending of budgetary funds;
- enhancing assistance to export-oriented enterprises;
- increasing the volume of privileged loans to businessmen; and
- intensifying the government's support of agriculture.¹⁶⁵

The existence of the large necroeconomic sector as well as the practice of financing businesses from public resources as one of the methods of combating the crisis, is a clear indication of the exposure of Azerbaijan's economy (including the necroeconomy) to the danger of zombie-ing which was discussed above in the general context of the post-Communist countries.

The Case of Bulgaria

In 2008, Bulgaria – like many other countries – was quite optimistic and believed that the global crisis would not pose an immense threat to its economy.¹⁶⁶ At the time, economic forecasts for Bulgaria were not very pessimistic,¹⁶⁷ although some believed that the Bulgarian economy might encounter serious challenges in 2009-10.¹⁶⁸ In fact, the global financial crisis affected Bulgaria rather significantly.¹⁶⁹ Specifically, while GDP increased by 6.0% in 2008 as compared to 2007, it declined by 4.7% during the first nine months in 2009 as compared to the same period in 2008.¹⁷⁰ At the same time, the annual inflation accounted for 7.8% in 2008 and 0.6% in 2009.¹⁷¹ In 2009, 95% of Bulgarian companies saw a drop in their sales.¹⁷²

165 Masimli, "Azerbaijan and the World Financial Crisis," 81.

166 See, for example, Kerin Hope and Theodor Troev, "Bulgaria Brushes Aside Warning Signs," *Financial Times*, 19 November 2008; Clive Leviev-Sawyer, "Global Financial Crisis 'No Direct Threat to Bulgaria,' Summit Told," *Sofia Echo Media*, 18 October 2008, http://sofiaecho.com/2008/10/18/664233_global-financial-crisis-no-direct-threat-to-bulgaria-summit-told.

167 "The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Bulgaria," *SkyscraperCity*, 3 November 2008, <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=744206>.

168 Dimitar Chobanov, "Bulgarian Economy Development and the World Crisis," *Economic Policy Review* 4, no. 66 (August 2008), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/bulgarian-economy-development-and-the-world-crisis/>.

169 See, for example, Veselina Yordanova, "Bulgaria: 2009, Year of Crisis," *Ekonom: east*, 1 January 2010, <http://www.emportal.rs/en/news/region/109314.html>.

170 National Statistical Institute, "National Accounts. Gross Domestic Product," http://www.nsi.bg/Gdp_e/Gdp_e.htm (accessed 29 January 2010).

171 National Statistical Institute, "Consumer Price Indices," http://www.nsi.bg/Cpi_e/Cpi_e.htm (accessed 29 January 2010).

172 "95% of Bulgarian Companies Saw Drop in Sales in 2009," *Novinite.com*, 21 December 2009, http://188.40.98.135/~novinite/view_news.php?id=111285.

When examining the economic situation in Bulgaria, one should take into account that the country (just like Romania) joined the EU only in 2007 and, therefore, had not been fully integrated into the EU market when the global financial crisis hit.¹⁷³ Additionally, Bulgaria's monetary policy is being constrained by the fact that the currency board arrangement connects the lev, the Bulgarian national currency, to the euro.¹⁷⁴ It is during the period of a financial crisis that the policy of a fixed exchange rate poses extraordinary difficulties, even though it is more of a problem to move towards a free floating exchange rate during the crisis in that foreign liabilities in the national currency will become significantly more expensive.¹⁷⁵

As in many other countries, the crisis significantly affected the industrial sector. In 2008, for example, the gross value added (GVA) increased by 3.0% as compared to 2007, whilst it dropped by 8.3% during the first nine months of 2009 as compared to the same period in 2008.¹⁷⁶ In the first quarter of 2009, the total income of the five largest companies operating in the chemical industry sector decreased by 46.2%¹⁷⁷ and 29,000 jobs were lost in the country's machine building sector in 2009.¹⁷⁸

Using the national budget for salary supplements to company employees whose working hours have been decreased due to the crisis is one of the significant anti-crisis measures developed by the Bulgarian government. However, such an approach only keeps companies with poor management on the market.¹⁷⁹ Also, state interference by artificially holding up the employment level is a populist measure that eventually distorts market mechanisms for employment.¹⁸⁰ During the economic crisis, there was a clear temptation in Bulgaria to fund various types of businesses from the national budget.¹⁸¹ This trend, which is economically less justified and entirely

173 See, for example, Petrova, "Implications of the current financial crisis on the new EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania," 7.

174 Gavras and Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," 9.

175 Åslund, "Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Eastern Europe," 3.

176 National Statistical Institute, "National Accounts. Gross Domestic Product."

177 "Bulgaria Chemical Industry Collapses over Global Financial Crisis," *Novinite.com*, 24 March 2009, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=102189.

178 Ivan Dikov, "Branch Chamber Chair Iliya Keleshev: Bulgaria's Machine Building to Face Skilled Labor Shortage after Recovery from Crisis," *Novinite.com*, 23 November 2009, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=110317.

179 Adriana Mladenova, "Stimulating Employment during the Crisis – How It Should Not Be Done," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 70 (February 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/stimulating-employment-during-a-crisis-how-it-should-not-be-done/>.

180 Zornitza Manolova, "How Regulation Distorts Employment," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 71 (March 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/how-regulation-distorts-employment/>.

181 Metodi V. Metodiev, "Again 'New' State Companies," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 72 (May 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/again-new-state-companies/>.

populist, became a reality after the Parliamentary elections of July 2009,¹⁸² thereby facilitating the zombie-ing of the economy.

Most of Bulgarian banks are foreign owned and continue to meet their responsibilities in spite of the financial crisis.¹⁸³ However, Bulgaria's banking system has not escaped the zombie-ing process either.¹⁸⁴ State subsidies in Bulgaria, along with other means of protectionism, are often used to assist various businesses with such measures becoming even more popular in light of the financial crisis.¹⁸⁵

The Bulgarian bankruptcy legislation, that was *per se* defective,¹⁸⁶ has been suspended.¹⁸⁷ In spite of it, Kremikovtzi AD, for example, – the country's largest metalworking company that was established at the beginning of the 1960s – was subject to liquidation.¹⁸⁸ On the one hand, this is an absolutely significant phenomenon as Bulgaria will not have one of its largest companies as a part of the necroeconomy. On the other hand, it may become the first step towards freeing Bulgaria from a necroeconomy, a fact that also justifies why Bulgaria is considered amongst the "leader" countries of the Black Sea Region.

After the elections, the government of Bulgaria is ready to share Georgia's experience in the field of economic liberalisation.¹⁸⁹ Unfortunately, Georgia – just like the programme of the new government of Bulgaria¹⁹⁰ – has made a number of mistakes, due to which liberalism frequently happened to be the "façade" of the reforms rather than their content.¹⁹¹

182 Petar Ganev, "Question Mark (?) and Exclamation Mark (!) for the Budgetary Expenses?!" *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 73 (June 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/question-mark-and-exclamation-mark-for-the-budgetary-expenses/>.

183 Gavras and Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," 9.

184 Zornitza Manolova, "10 Facts about the Unneeded Bank," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 74 (July 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/10-facts-about-the-unneeded-bank/>.

185 Svetla Kostadinova, "The Erroneous Calculations of the Government," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 72 (May 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/the-erroneous-calculations-of-the-government/>.

186 Metodiev, "The Idea of Effective Bankruptcy."

187 Chobanov, "Measures Against the Crisis;" Petar Ganev, "Bulgarian Economy..." *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 75 (October 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/bulgarian-economy/>.

188 Krassen Stanchev, "A Historic 'Farewell' to Kremikovtzi AD," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 76 (December 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/a-historic-farewell-to-kremikovtzi-ad/>.

189 Svetla Kostadinova, "Djankov, Follow Saakashvili's Example," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 75 (October 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/djankov-follow-saakashvili-s-example/>.

190 Svetla Kostadinova, "The Messages in the Government Program," *Economic Policy Review* 5, no. 76 (December 2009), <http://ime.bg/en/articles/the-messages-in-the-government-program/>.

191 See, for example, Vladimer Papava, "Anatomical Pathology of Georgia's Rose Revolution," *Current Politics and Economics of the Caucasus Region* 2, no. 1 (2009): 6-13.

Georgia and the New Economic Challenges

In the spring of 2008, even though signs of the upcoming difficulties were already apparent, the negative impact on Georgia of the then-still-developing US financial crisis was not expected to be high, owing to the underdeveloped and relatively isolated nature of Georgia's financial market.¹⁹² After the five-day Russian-Georgian war of August 2008,¹⁹³ some new economic challenges have been added.¹⁹⁴ These include, in particular, liquidating the economic damage that was caused by the war, avoiding a crisis in the banking sector, preventing any further growth of the relatively high inflation rate, and preserving exchange rate stability of the national currency, the lari.

Generally speaking, the Georgian economy stood the test of the five-day Russian-Georgian war, although it had to deal with a number of considerable difficulties in the aftermath.¹⁹⁵ For instance, the country suffered huge direct economic damage consisting of ruined settlements and infrastructure combined with considerable environmental damage. In the course of 2008, all doubts regarding the negative impact of the global financial crisis upon Georgia's economy disappeared. It must be noted that the summary economic indicators for 2008 clearly reflect the implications of both the global financial crisis and Russia's military aggression.

In order to describe the present economic situation in Georgia, some official statistical data that, unfortunately, do not always correspond to real facts must be used. After the Rose Revolution, the Department of Statistics was incorporated within the Ministry of Economic Development; a move that clearly indicates a conflict of interests and has enabled the government to often manipulate statistical data for its own political benefit.¹⁹⁶ According to the official statistics, the economic growth rate in Georgia amounted to as little as 2.3% in 2008 (it was 9.6% in 2005, 9.4% in 2006 and 12.3% in 2007),¹⁹⁷ and the annual inflation rate stood at 5.5%.¹⁹⁸ In this con-

192 Nina Akhmeteli, "Will the American Economic Crisis Hit Georgia?" *Investor.ge*, 2 April 2008, http://www.investor.ge/issues/2008_2/01.htm.

193 See, for example, Cornell and Starr, eds., *The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia*.

194 Molly Corso, "Georgia's Expansion Halts," *Caucasus Analytical Digest: The Caucasus in the Global Financial Crisis*, no. 6, 21 May 2009, 5-7, http://www.hertie-school.org/binaries/addon/1282_caucasus_economic_report.pdf; Marco Giuli, "Georgia and the Systemic Impact of the Financial Crisis," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 3, no. 3 (2009): 261-277; Davit Narmania, "Economic Policy in Georgia: Liberalization, Economic Crises and Changes," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (2009): 117-8.

195 Merab Kakulia, "Mitigating Post-War Economic Threats in Georgia," *Georgian Economic Trends*, October 2008, 7-10; Vladimer Papava, "Georgia's Economy: Post-revolutionary Development and Post-War Difficulties," *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (2009): 207-9.

196 Papava, "Anatomical Pathology of Georgia's Rose Revolution," 11.

197 National Statistics Office of Georgia, "GDP," 2009, http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=119&lang=eng (accessed 29 January 2010).

198 National Statistics Office of Georgia, "CPI (Inflation)," 2009, http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=128&lang=eng (accessed 29 January 2010).

text, it must be noted that the apparent deficiency of Georgia's GDP resides in the fact that the public administration represents the biggest segment of economy, with a 17% share of GDP.¹⁹⁹

As far as Georgia's economic crisis is concerned, it is important to stress that it also has its own domestic roots which can be found in the economic policy mistakes that the post-revolution government made in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution.²⁰⁰ Other factors that have contributed directly to the rise of the economic crisis in Georgia are the following:

- i) vast amounts of FDI streamed into privatisations and acquisitions of real estate that led to an obvious imbalance in which the inflow of financial resources into the country substantially exceeded the sector's real growth rates;
- ii) the government's lack of control over the developments in the construction sector has resulted in the industry becoming dominated by a Ponzi scheme ("financial pyramids"); and
- iii) banks incremented their lending resources basically by accumulating cheap resources from European financial markets with the majority of such resources having been lent for construction and the acquisition of consumer goods, of which 100% are imported. Almost all of the imported lending resources, therefore, were used to finance the construction businesses infected by a Ponzi scheme and the import of consumer goods. Obviously, such developments could not positively influence the country's economy.

The crisis has also badly affected the national budget. In June 2009, the parliament approved a US\$300 million cut in tax revenues of the national budget which accounts for 10.5% of all tax revenues previously planned for the fiscal year of 2009. At the same time, the national budget grew due to international donor assistance.²⁰¹

In reply to the Russian aggression, the international community provided significant financial assistance to Georgia. At a donor's conference held in Brussels under the aegis of the World Bank in October 2008, it was decided to allocate to post-war Georgia the amount of US\$4.55 billion – of which US\$2 billion is a grant and the remainder a loan – in financial aid.²⁰² The country

199 Nodar Khaduri, "Georgia: Economy," in *Central Eurasia 2008* (Luleå: CA&CC Press, 2009), 151-2.

200 Papava, "Anatomical Pathology of Georgia's Rose Revolution;" Irakli Rukhadze and Mark Hauf, "The Georgian Economy under Saakashvili," *The Financial*, 21 April 2009, http://www.finchannel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35088&Itemid=13.

201 "Budgetary Amendments Unveiled," *Civil.Ge, Daily News Online*, 17 June 2009, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21128&search=budget>.

202 The United Nations and the World Bank, *Georgia Joint Needs Assessment: Donor Funding in Support of Post-Conflict Recovery and Reconstruction*; Progress Report (New York and Washington, D.C.: UN and World Bank, 30 June 2009), http://www.mof.ge/common/get_doc.aspx?doc_id=5994.

is to receive these funds during the 2008-10 period of which a large part is to be spent on the liquidation of the economic damage caused to Georgia by the Russian military aggression. The negative effects of the Georgian economic crisis might have been far more distressing had the international community not extended a helping hand. In other words, although war by essence is a negative phenomenon, it had a positive implication for Georgia, to the extent that the country received an enormous amount of international financial assistance. This creates a so-called "Paradox of War" or a situation wherein aggression entails not only negative but some positive consequences as well.

The year 2009 has been marked with an obvious decline in the Georgian economy. The year's first quarter GDP rate accounted for only 94.9% of its 2008 level, and the second and third quarters stood at 89.9% and 98.8% respectively.²⁰³ Under such circumstances, the ten largest Georgian companies significantly reduced their production capacities and some stopped operating entirely,²⁰⁴ thereby creating favourable conditions for the succession of a necroeconomy. Although the government periodically buys large amounts of fertilisers from Georgia's largest chemical factory, Azot, even this enterprise had to stop its production.²⁰⁵ Most surprisingly, however, these enterprises continued producing their products for the first months of 2009, in the "best" tradition of a necroeconomy and despite the obvious crisis in the Georgian economy, even though there was no demand for their output. They simply stopped their activities in April and May when the warehouses were completely filled with unwanted products.²⁰⁶

To help the country overcome the economic crisis, the government developed a so-called "new financial package" that attempts to strengthen the banking and construction sectors.²⁰⁷ The government is planning to issue some treasury bills with an aggregate value of US\$155 million which will be invested in infrastructure projects. In this way, it aims to provide some assistance to commercial banks which are going to be the key recipients of those treasury bills. In times of economic crisis, the treasury bills will enable the banks to raise some assured incomes from the national budget funds. In addition, the package provides for the weakening of the governmental regulation of banks. As a result, the government hopes that the banks will be able to attract some additional US\$420 million in lending resources. Furthermore, the package envisages the issuance by Tbilisi City Hall of some financial guarantees to construction companies as a means of encouraging banks to lend them funds that will then be spent for the renovation of the old sections of the capital.

203 National Statistics Office of Georgia, "GDP"

204 Ben Aris, "Donor Money Keeps Georgia Afloat," *bne—businessneweurope*, August 2009, 61.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.

207 "Government Offers New Plan to Boost Economy," *Civil.Ge, Daily News Online*, 30 June 2009, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21180>.

Although the problem of the necroeconomy during an economic crisis is a timely one, fortunately, the government's anti-crisis plans have hitherto not given any indication that the government is going to finance necro-economic facilities. However, one must bear in mind that no official bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated at this point with respect to any of the country's necro-economic enterprises.²⁰⁸ Furthermore, as was noted above, the government of Georgia is going to provide financial assistance to the construction companies many of which represent a Ponzi scheme. This is nothing less than a step towards the zombie-ing of the construction companies as well as of the banks which will be extending loans to them.

Greece: The Case for a Non-Post-Communist Country

Amongst the other countries of the Black Sea Region, Greece, like Turkey, has the advantage of not having a Communist past. Unlike Turkey, however, Greece is a member of the EU and is characterised by quite a high degree of EU market integration.

In spite of a relatively high level of economic development, Greece has not been able to avoid the negative impact of the global financial crisis.²⁰⁹ If in 2008 Greece's GDP increased by 2.0% as compared with the previous year, it dropped by 2.0% in 2009 with this decreasing trend forecasted to be continuing in 2010.²¹⁰ As for the inflation rate, the situation is more stable in this regard. Specifically, while in 2008 the annual inflation rate stood at 4.2%, it dropped to 1.3% in 2009.²¹¹ Overall, however, it can be said that Greece's economy is faced with a rather difficult situation.²¹²

From the very beginning, optimism for the impact of the crisis²¹³ was created due to the stability of Greece's banking system as well as by the fact that it is not an industrial country and its

208 Lela Koberidze, "Ratom ver kotrdeba gasakotrebeli" [Why it is Impossible to Bankrupt Already Bankrupt Entities], *BusinessPresa.ge*, 27 November 2009, <http://anonymouse.ru:8080/newmouse/browse.php?u=Oi8vYnVzaW5lc3MucHJlc2EuZ2UvP3A9MjU3Ng%3D%3D&b=5>.

209 "Statement by the Honorable Giulio Tremonti Minister of Economy and Finance, and Governor of the IMF for Italy Speaking on behalf of Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, San Marino, and Timor-Leste International Monetary and Financial Committee" (IMF International Monetary and Financial Committee Twentieth Meeting, Istanbul, 4 October 2009), 3-4, <http://www.imf.org/External/AM/2009/imfc/statement/eng/ita.pdf>.

210 European Commission, Eurostat, "Real GDP Growth Rate," 2009, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&code=tsieb020> (accessed 29 January 2010).

211 Ibid.

212 See, for example, Ovidiu Palcu, "Bad Days for the Greek Economy," *Wave*, 4 October 2009, <http://www.wavemagazine.net/arhiva/30/econ/financial-crisis-greece.htm>.

213 See, for example, Panos Livadas, "Global Crisis: Greek Resilience in Turbulent Times" (paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 5 February 2009), <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/files/Woodrow%20Wilson%20Narrow08-02-20090.doc>.

economy is not significantly dependent upon its exports (shipping and tourism are important for the country).²¹⁴ Nevertheless, the global economic crisis affected Greek industry quite badly. Industrial production dropped by 6.0% in November 2009, as compared to the same period a year earlier, and the situation deteriorated at the beginning of 2010 with industrial production having declined by 12.8% as compared to the same period a year before.²¹⁵

Without a Communist past, Greece's economy is not faced with the phenomenon of a necro-economy. Given the crisis, however, the threat of zombie-ing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and related banks was created through the same scheme,²¹⁶ which was applied some twenty years ago in Japan; that is, securing cheap loans with state guarantees. It was later revealed that Greece's problem in the financial sector was most serious requiring major efforts by its government.

In contrast to the other countries of the Black Sea Region, only a small portion of the Greek banking system is owned by foreigners.²¹⁷ Given the variety of financial instruments, not a single bank has gone bankrupt during the current crisis in Greece.²¹⁸ In contrast, the national budget of Greece has encountered the most significant challenge. Greece was the only Eurozone country that issued bonds for substantial sums in the first quarter of 2009.²¹⁹ Greece used to apply this instrument quite frequently in the past together with some other Eurozone countries (Spain, Italy, Ireland) and this could have posed serious problems for Greece and the Eurozone in general according to the experts.²²⁰ As it was expected, the situation deteriorated at the end of 2009, when the new government realised that the national budget deficit accounted for 12.7%, a figure higher than previously estimated for 2010.²²¹ Under these circumstances and

214 Georgios Zoumpoulidis, "Financial Crisis Update – Greece," *NewsBlaze*, 30 November 2008, <http://newsblaze.com/story/20081130062929blyw.nb/topstory.html>.

215 "Industrial Production Up by 1.0% in Euro Area," *Eurostat Newsrelease, Euroindicators 7/2010*, 14 January 2010, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/4-14012010-AP/EN/4-14012010-AP-EN.PDF.

216 Dimitris Karantinos, "Greece: The Impact of Financial Crisis upon the Economy," *European Employment Observatory*, 1 January 2009, 4, <http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/resources/reports/Greece-ImpactOffinancialCrisisOnEconomy.pdf>; "Summary of Government Interventions Greece," Mayer Brown Public Documents, 21 April 2009, http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/0261fin_Summary_Government_Interventions_Greece.pdf; Anda Stamati, "Tackling the Recession: Greece," European Monitoring Centre on Change, 13 July 2009, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/studies/tn0907020s/gr0907029q.htm>.

217 Gavras and Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," 7.
218 *Ibid.*, 9.

219 *Ibid.*, 15.

220 "Can Countries Really Go Bankrupt?" *Spiegel International Edition*, 30 January 2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,604523,00.html>; Susannah Verney, "Flaky Fringe? Southern Europe Facing the Financial Crisis," *South European Society and Politics* 14, no. 1 (2009): 3.

221 Carlo Bastasin, "Another Greek Lesson: As Always Hard But Inspiring," *Real Time Economic Issues Watch* (Washington, D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 16 December 2009),

since this can also pose a threat to other countries of the Eurozone,²²² it is of paramount importance for the Greek government to carry out those reforms that will secure a decrease in the budget deficit and in public expenditures in general in order to overcome the debt crisis.²²³

Moldova and Political Difficulties

For Moldova, by far the poorest country in Europe,²²⁴ 2009 proved to be rather difficult as the country experienced its thorniest political crisis as a result of the impact of the global financial crisis.²²⁵

In 2008, the government turned a blind eye to the economic crisis and was inconsistent between its statements and concrete actions.²²⁶ As the political crisis sharpened in 2009, the effects of the economic and financial crisis were clearly beginning to emerge in Moldova.²²⁷ It is noteworthy that the economic crisis in Moldova has also been aggravated by the fact that significant economic reforms have hitherto not been completed.²²⁸

<http://www.piie.com/realtime/?p=1101>. Unfortunately, the previous government made every effort to conceal the truth. See, Tony Barber, "Greece Condemned for Falsifying Data," *Financial Times*, 12 January 2010.

222 See, for example, "Fears Grow that Greek Financial Crisis could Spill Across Eurozone," *Times of Malta*, 10 December 2009, <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20091210/world-news/fears-grow-that-greek-financial-crisis-could-spill-across-eurozone> (accessed 29 January 2010).

223 See, for example, Bastasin, "Another Greek Lesson: As Always Hard But Inspiring;" Rachel Donadio, "Greek Leader Offers Plan to Tackle Debt Crisis," *New York Times*, 14 December 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/europe/15greece.html?_r=1.

224 See, for example, Laurence Chandy, Geoffrey Gertz and Johannes Linn, "Tracking the Global Financial Crisis: An Analysis of the IMF's World Economic Outlook" (Washington, D.C.: Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings), May 2009, 7, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2009/05_financial_crisis_linn/05_financial_crisis_linn.pdf.

225 See, for example, James Lamond, "Moldova and the Economic Crisis," *Democracy Arsenal*, 9 April 2009, <http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2009/04/the-food-crisis-last-year-led-to-food-riots-and-the-fall-of-the-government-in-haiti-the-global-financial-crisis-led-to-the-c.html>; Louis O'Neill, "No Quick Fix for Moldova's Political Crisis," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 30 November 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/No_Quick_Fix_For_Moldovas_Political_Crisis/1891080.html.

226 Victoria Vasilescu, "Dilemmas of the Attractiveness of Moldovan Economy in the Context of Moldova's European Integration," *Policy Brief*, no. 6 (Chisinau: Association for Participatory Democracy ADEPT, 22 October 2009), 5, <http://www.e-democracy.md/files/policy-briefs/policy-brief-6-vasilescu-en.pdf>.

227 "Statement by H.E. Mr. Alexandru Cujba, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," New York, 29 September 2009, 2, http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/MD_en.pdf.

228 "The Global Financial 'Crisis Hits Home' in Europe and Central Asia," The World Bank Press Release no: 2010/ECA/172, 2 December 2009, <http://go.worldbank.org/ZWR7UEM0Z0>.

Although in 2008 the country underwent some difficulties (for instance, it was hit by a severe drought), the economy of Moldova was quite stable.²²⁹ Specifically, GDP increased by 7.8%. The situation changed quite drastically in 2009 when GDP decreased by 7.7% between January and September 2009 in comparison with the same period in 2008.²³⁰ While the annual inflation rate stood at 7.3% in 2008, it was only 0.4% in 2009.²³¹

Taking into consideration that remittances are very important for the population in Moldova, it is easy to understand that the drastic decline in consumption in 2009 was due mostly to a one-third decrease in remittances.²³² Due to the global crisis, a significant number of working migrants from Moldova returned home (especially from Russia and Italy), thereby further exacerbating the unemployment problem.²³³

The year 2008 was not optimistic for Moldova's industry as the volume index of industrial production stood at 100.7% compared with 2007, while 2009 proved to be even worse since the index was at only 76.8% during the first eleven months.²³⁴ Moldova's industry is characterised by the fact that most of its share, specifically more than 43%, comes from the production of food and alcoholic beverages.²³⁵ The shares of the chemical industry and metallurgy account only for 1.3% and 0.5% respectively of the country's total industrial output.²³⁶ Also, a Russian embargo of Moldovan alcoholic products complicates the situation. At the same time, the key problem for the chemical industry and metallurgy is the necroeconomy which was created during the Soviet period.

It needs to be highlighted that Moldova has passed through various crises over the last twenty years and the current one does not have a significant impact upon approximately 30% of the companies as their representatives consider that they have always been in a crisis.²³⁷ Experienc-

229 Liudmila Golovataya, "Republic of Moldova: Economy," in *Central Eurasia 2008* (Luleå: CA&CC Press, 2009), 263.

230 National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "National Accounts," <http://www.statistica.md/category.php?l=en&idc=191&>.

231 National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Consumer Price Indices," <http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=en&idc=335&id=2344>.

232 Vasilescu, "Dilemmas of the Attractiveness of Moldovan Economy in the Context of Moldova's European Integration," 2.

233 Expert Group, "Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the Local Communities in Moldova," UNDP Moldova, 9 August 2009, 11, http://www.undp.md/presscentre/2009/ILDP_Report_Crisis/Report_impact_financial_crisis_eng.pdf.

234 National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Industry," <http://www.statistica.md/category.php?l=en&idc=127&> (accessed 29 January 2010).

235 Golovataya, "Republic of Moldova: Economy," 269.

236 Ibid.

237 Expert Group, *Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the Local Communities in Moldova*, 54-5.

ing a constant crisis by the companies facilitates the formation of a zombie-ing routine. Moreover, if the companies are also necroeconomic, the zombie-ing routine is being formed in such companies upon the basis of a necroeconomic routine which is certainly even worse.

Under the ongoing crisis, 17.6% of Moldovan companies (mostly the ones in the retailing, industrial, agriculture and construction sectors) have accumulated debts to suppliers whilst 23.0% (mostly service companies) have accumulated debts from clients.²³⁸ Under such circumstances, tax slashing and making credits less expensive by cutting interest rates are desirable for most companies, whilst honest competition in the market, reducing corruption and diminishing number of state controls are important for a smaller number of companies.²³⁹

In this context, the adoption and implementation of a targeted and effective anti-crisis programme is of crucial importance. In 2009, Moldova failed to elect a President due to contradictions within its Parliament (the Constitution of Moldova envisages the election of the President by the Parliament) thereby creating an unstable political environment for the government. In parallel, the government faces a significant challenge to strengthen its position to such an extent that it will be able to win the snap Parliamentary elections which may be called in 2010.²⁴⁰ This situation may give an impetus to the government to lead the country out of this economic crisis but, at the same time, it increases the threat of populism which has already been reflected in the disagreement amongst government members over the anti-crisis programme.²⁴¹

The Romanian Experience

As mentioned above, Romania and Bulgaria became EU member states only on 1 January 2007 and, therefore, they were not yet fully integrated into the EU market when the global financial crisis arrived on their doorstep.²⁴² With significant foreign capital in Romania (nearly 90% of Romania's banking sector is foreign-owned)²⁴³ the first indications of the negative impact of the crisis appeared in the autumn of 2008.²⁴⁴ This was due principally to the financial difficulties faced by the headquarters of these foreign companies. It is noteworthy to mention that even

238 Ibid., 59.

239 Ibid., 62.

240 Ben Aris, "Moldova at Historic Crossroads," *bne—businessneweurope*, October 2009, 8.

241 Obiectiv Media Group (OMEGA), "Anti-crisis Programme of Government Causes Disagreements Among Ministers," 13 November 2009, <http://www.omg.md/Content.aspx?id=5711&lang=2>.

242 See, for example, Petrova, "Implications of the current financial crisis on the new EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania," 7.

243 Gavras and Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," 9.

244 Craig Whitlock, "Financial Crisis Leaves Romania Reeling," *Washington Post*, 5 November 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/04/AR2008110403603.html>.

before the mortgage crisis evolved into a global one there were enough warning bells regarding its impact on Romania.²⁴⁵

Although the impact of the global financial crisis upon the annual indicators of the country's economic growth was obscure in 2008, certain problems in the financial and budgetary spheres were quite discernible.²⁴⁶ Difficulties in the Romanian economy became apparent in 2009.²⁴⁷ For example, industry decreased by 7.7% during this period.²⁴⁸ In 2008, GDP increased by 7.1% compared to 2007 while in the first nine months of 2009, it decreased by 7.4%.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, the annual inflation rate in 2008 stood at 6.3%²⁵⁰ whilst during the first eleven months of 2009, it was observed at 4.7%.²⁵¹

In 2009, significant difficulties became apparent in the country's mining and quarrying sector. Specifically, its production level decreased by 10.9% in November against the same indicator for 2008 although industrial production as a whole increased by 4.4% during the same period.²⁵² A significant decrease in production levels was also observed in some of other hard industry sectors at the same time.²⁵³

Although the country's economy was also burdened with the necroeconomy after the fall of the Communist regime, Romania comes under the group of "leader" countries since the efforts to remove this phenomenon were very impressive. Specifically, Romania has a greater bankruptcy rate than the average level in Eastern Europe.²⁵⁴

245 Constantin Ionete, "The Beginnings and Dissemination of the Crisis of Mortgage Credits in the USA. Risks in the Evolution of Romanian Economy," *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 7 (2008): 14-20; Jenica Popescu, Sabin Rizescu and Alia Duță, "Romanian Economy Evolution's Risks in Conditions of U.S. Housing and Real Estate Market Crisis," *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 8 (2008): 113-6.

246 Elena Glodeanu and Cristinel Glodeanu, "Manifestations of World Economic Crisis in Romania – Cause and Effect," *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 9 (2009): 273-6.

247 See, for example, Anton Caragea, "Romania Headed toward National Bankruptcy," *Worldpress.org*, 19 June 2009, <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/3367.cfm#down>.

248 Constantin Ionete, "The Global Financial Crisis Follows its Way," *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 9 (2009): 11.

249 National Institute of Statistics, "Monthly Statistical Bulletin," November 2009, 146, http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/arhiva_buletine2009/bsl_11.pdf (accessed 29 January 2010).

250 National Institute of Statistics, "Monthly Statistical Bulletin," December 2008, 125, http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/arhiva_buletine2008/bsl_12.pdf (accessed 29 January 2010).

251 National Institute of Statistics, "Monthly Statistical Bulletin," November 2009, 133.

252 National Institute of Statistics, "Industry Statistical Bulletin," November 2009, 5-7, http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/arhiva_buletine2009/bsi_11.pdf (accessed 29 January 2010).

253 *Ibid.*, 6.

254 Daniel Cîrciumaru, Marian Siminiča and Nina Begicevic, "A Study Regarding the Bankruptcy in Romania. Regional Comparisons," *Revista Tinerilor Economisti* [The Young Economists Journal] 1, no. 9 (2007): 148-154.

Under the conditions of the ongoing crisis, seven out of ten private SMEs in Romania have financial problems of which 15% are on the verge of bankruptcy.²⁵⁵ This situation puts pressure upon the government urging it to provide financial support to such enterprises.²⁵⁶

It is noteworthy that at the beginning of 2010, the Romanian government guaranteed up to 80% of the loan agreement worth €400 million which was granted to *Ford Romania* by the European Investment Bank. In connection to this, Emil Boc, the Prime Minister, tasked the Minister of Finance to develop the legislative framework for extending the use of state guarantees to other sectors of the economy.²⁵⁷ In view of the tough challenges faced by the country's banking system and the global financial crisis,²⁵⁸ the implementation of the aforementioned initiative may lead to the beginning of the zombie-ing process.

The Russian Economy and the Global Economic and Financial Crisis

Since the financial crisis of August 1998, Russia's economy has developed at an impressive pace; GDP growth almost doubled over the past ten years,²⁵⁹ and the economy has become much more attractive to foreign investors. Also, given the global increase in oil prices, the country's international reserves reached almost US\$600 billion, lagging behind only those of China and Japan.²⁶⁰

The impact of the global financial crisis on Russia's economy was already visible in the summer of 2008. This can be explained by the fact that almost half of the assets on the Russian stock exchange came from non-residents (including a significant number of Americans) that started to withdraw their capital, a move that led to a significant drop of Russian securities prices.²⁶¹ On

255 Luminița Chivu, "Employers Dissatisfied with Progress of Anti-Crisis Measures," *Eironline – European Industrial Relations Observatory*, 10 August 2009, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/07/articles/ro0907049i.htm>.

256 Ibid.

257 "Address by PM Emil Boc at the signing of the 'Guarantee Agreement' between Public Finance Ministry and European Investment Bank and of the Guarantee Convention between Public Finance Ministry and Ford," Government of Romania – Press Office, 21 January 2010, http://www.gov.ro/address-by-pm-emil-boc-at-the-signing-of-the-guarantee-agreement-between-public-finance-ministry-and-european-investment-bank-and-of-the-guarantee__l2a107865.html.

258 Ioan Nistor, Maria Ulici and Mirela-Oana Pinteș, "The Global Financial Crisis and its Implications on the Romanian Banking Systems," *Finance – Challenges of the Future* 1, no. 9 (2009): 160-7.

259 OECD, "Ekonomicheskii' obzor OESR po Rossijskoi' Federatsii" [OECD Economic Survey of the Russian Federation, 2009], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 8 (2009): 54.

260 Ibid.

261 Aleksandr Bulatov, "Skhodstvo i razlichii ekonomicheskogo krizisa v SShA i Rossii" [Economic Crisis in the USA and Russia: Similarities and Differences], *Vestnik instituta Kennana v Rossii* [Kennan Institute Bulletin in Russia] 15 (2009): 32-3.

top of that, oil, gas and metal prices in international markets plunged, causing a GDP growth rate decrease and, consequently, an increase in unemployment.²⁶²

In 2008, Russia's GDP increased by 5.6% as compared to 2007²⁶³ whilst it increased only 1.2% in the fourth quarter of 2008 compared to the fourth quarter of 2007.²⁶⁴ In 2009, the situation deteriorated substantially: in the first quarter of 2009, GDP decreased by 9.8% as compared to the first quarter of 2008. This trend continued in the second and third quarters of 2009 where the decrease amounted to 10.9% and 9.9% respectively.²⁶⁵ Inflation in Russia stood at 13.3% in 2008 and at 7.4% in the first six months of 2009.²⁶⁶ As far as Russian industry is concerned, the industrial production index was 102.1% in 2008 while it dropped to 85.2% in the first half of 2009.²⁶⁷

With most of the necroeconomic enterprises concentrated in the industry sector, it comes as no surprise that this sector had the most significant decrease as a result of the economic crisis.²⁶⁸ As mentioned above, under normal circumstances the existence of a necroeconomy is less visible in the countries with large-scale markets, since competition within the country creates the illusion that the economy is not burdened with the necroeconomy. The best example of this is Russia.²⁶⁹

The Russian economic crisis can be attributed not only to foreign but, rather, to domestic factors, particularly to the accumulated unsolved problems characteristic of the country's industry and its economy as a whole.²⁷⁰ The opinion, according to which national factors underlie Rus-

262 Ibid., 33.

263 Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS), "Real GDP Used," http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b00_25/IssWWW.exe/Stg/dvvp/i000230r.htm (accessed 29 January 2010).

264 FSSS, "Real GDP Used (by Quarters)," http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b00_25/IssWWW.exe/Stg/dvvp/i000390r.htm (accessed 29 January 2010).

265 Ibid.

266 FSSS, "Consumer Price Indices," http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_06/IssWWW.exe/Stg/3/15-01.htm (accessed 29 January 2010).

267 FSSS, "Production Index," http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_06/IssWWW.exe/Stg/3/06-01.htm (accessed 29 January 2010).

268 Andrei Illarionov, "Eto – katastrofa. Bespredsidentnyi promyshlennyi spad noiabria" [It's a Catastrophe. An Unprecedented Drop of Industrial Output in November] (Moscow: Institute of Economic Analysis, 2008), http://www.iea.ru/econom_rost.php?id=26; Andrei Illarionov, "Noiabr'skii spad promyshlennogo proizvodstva – katastrofa, kotoraiia usugubliaetsia deistviavi vlastei" [The November Drops in Industrial Output – Catastrophe which is Aggravated by Government's Actions] (Moscow: Institute of Economic Analysis, 2008), <http://www.iea.ru/macroeconom.php?id=14>.

269 See, for example, Schaffer and Kuznetsov, "Productivity," 12-34.

270 Anders Åslund, "10 Reasons Why the Russian Economy Will Falter," *Moscow Times*, 3 September 2008, <http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=997>; Andrei Illarionov, "Priroda rossiiskogo krizisa. Chem on ne iavliaetsia" [The Nature of the Russian Crisis. What It Is not] (Moscow: Institute of Economic Analysis, 29 December 2008), <http://www.iea.ru/macroeconom.php?id=16>.

sia's crisis and that the global financial crisis is only an additional one piled up in the financial, technological, economic, and political crises in Russia, should be considered to be true.²⁷¹ Another key factor is the country's technological backwardness,²⁷² which places the share of energy resources (and other low-technological commodities) in Russia's industrial export structure in a significant position.²⁷³ Stimulating this type of export has been at the top of all the economic policies that have been implemented by Russia's government in recent years.²⁷⁴ For example, the government promoted a special state programme supporting the development of high technologies,²⁷⁵ but its implementation was hampered by the emergence of the economic crisis.²⁷⁶

Undoubtedly, many Russian companies were able to get rid of their debts during the financial crisis without receiving governmental support.²⁷⁷ This situation led the government to work out a large-scale anti-crisis programme that envisaged providing state support to the economy by using a sizeable fiscal stimulus package.²⁷⁸ Specifically, the total cost of the programme's activities, which were carried out in the first months of the crisis, amounted to 13% of total GDP.²⁷⁹ However, it is the nature of the regime that allowed for the government to respond immediately to the economic crisis (although it has been criticised for its late response),²⁸⁰ as it showed great ability to provide money as a means of solving the problems quicker than any Western democratic process could envisage.²⁸¹ Additionally, the crisis notwithstanding, Russia's government has not abstained from incurring additional expenditures in various countries all over the world in order to achieve certain political goals.²⁸²

271 S. Dzarasov, "Rossii'skii' krizis: istoki i uroki" [The Crisis in Russia: Sources and Lessons], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 5 (2009): 81-2.

272 Ibid., 82.

273 Richard Connolly, "The Structure of Russian Industrial Exports in Comparative Perspective," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 49, no. 5 (2008): 586-603.

274 S. Dzarasov, "Rossii'skii' krizis: istoki i uroki," 78-9.

275 Connolly, "The Structure of Russian Industrial Exports in Comparative Perspective," 586-7.

276 OECD, "Ekonomicheskii' obzor OESR po Rossii'skoi' Federatsii," [OECD Economic Survey of the Russian Federation, 2009], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 8 (2009): 56.

277 Mau, "Drama 2008 goda," 5.

278 Gavras, *The Current State of Economic Development in the Black Sea Region*, 15.

279 OECD, "Ekonomicheskii' obzor OESR po Rossii'skoi' Federatsii," 57.

280 S. Aleksashenko, "Obval'noe padenie zakonchilos', krizis prodolzhaetsia" [The Downfall is Over, the Crisis Continues], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 5 (2009): 9.

281 Sir Basil Markesinis, "The American and Russian Economies in Moments of Crisis: A Geopolitical Study in Parallel," *ICBSS Policy Brief*, no. 19 (Athens: ICBSS, November 2009), 23, http://icbss.org/images/papers/pb_19_markesinis.pdf.

282 Ibid., 23-4.

Russia's anti-crisis policy aimed at i) increasing the liquidity of the financial sector, ii) providing social support to the population and iii) supporting the country's leading companies.²⁸³ Along with the tax cuts (for instance, the tax on profits was cut from 24% to 20% and the regions were allowed to decrease the small business tax from 15% to 5%), the government started to provide financial support to the pension funds, as well as guarantees for bank credits and direct financial support to large companies.²⁸⁴ If it were not for the financial support provided by the Central Bank and the government from the state budget (nationalisation, covering foreign debts, and securing governmental guarantees for bank credits), the banking system in Russia would have to confront an even more difficult situation.²⁸⁵ In certain cases, the funds allocated by the state were redistributed via bribes²⁸⁶ as evidenced by the low prices that were imposed by the government upon these deficit funds.²⁸⁷ The government made a list of so-called "system making" businesses that included up to 300 large companies to be assisted by the national budget as well as state banks.²⁸⁸ The regions also came up with a similar list of their own in order to provide support to relevant enterprises at the regional level.²⁸⁹

In order to provide real support, the government started to implement measures characteristic for the process of zombie-ing the economy. Specifically, state banks started to carry out direct concessional lending of businesses, governmental guarantees were issued for bank credits and the interest rates on the credits were subsidised from the national budget.²⁹⁰ Notably, the beneficiaries that qualify for government support are actually businesses from all segments of the economy, amongst which there is a concentration of necroeconomic enterprises such as, inter alia, in the metallurgy, machine building and motorcar building industries.²⁹¹

As for the application of the Law on Bankruptcy in Russia, it is beneath criticism. Since 2007, for example, this law no longer applies to state corporations and if an enterprise is considered to be a strategic one, priority is given to its preservation.²⁹² The management of state corporations, as

283 Bulatov, "Skhodstvo i razlichia ekonomicheskogo krizisa v SShA i Rossii," 35.

284 Ibid., 34-35.

285 See, for example, Ben Aris, "How Many Bankrupt Banks Does it Take to Make a Crisis?" *businessneweurope*, 15 July 2009, 13, <http://businessneweurope.eu/story1700>.

286 Mau, "Drama 2008 goda," 16.

287 Ibid.

288 Bulatov, "Skhodstvo i razlichia ekonomicheskogo krizisa v SShA i Rossii," 34.

289 Ibid.

290 SU-HSE and IAC, "Otsenka antikrizisnykh mer po podderzhke real'nogo sektora rocijskoi ekonomiki" [Evaluation of Anti-Crisis Measures Supporting the Real Sector of the Russian Economy], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 5 (2009): 24.

291 Ibid., 44-6.

292 Elena Apevalova and Aleksandr Radygin, "Bankrotstva v dvukhtysiachnye gody: ot instrumenta rei'derov k politike "dvojnogo standarta"" [Bankruptcies in Two Thousands: From the Instrument of the Raiders to the Policy of the "Double Standards"], *Ekonomicheskaja politika* [Economic Policy] 4 (2009): 109-10, http://www.iet.ru/files/text/policy/2009_4/apevalova-radygin.pdf.

a rule, is staffed by former employees of the Russian security service (KGB or its successor the FSB – Federal Security Bureau) and have no entrepreneurial know-how or experience leading, thus, to the insolvency of these corporations as a result of their lack of skills.²⁹³ In fact, the application of the Law on Bankruptcy significantly depends upon the political goals of the Kremlin. A vivid example of this is the well known case of the Yukos bankruptcy.²⁹⁴ Governmental influence upon the decisions taken in the bankruptcy sphere has increased since the end of 2008 due to the economic crisis.²⁹⁵

It is apparent that the anti-crisis measures carried out by the government keep afloat enterprises with obsolete technology, thus negatively affecting Russia's economic development in the post-crisis period.²⁹⁶ All in all, the anti-crisis programme is directed towards a comprehensive zombie-ing of the economy. Due to the large-scale of the necroeconomy in Russia, the zombie-ing process extends to the necroeconomic enterprises. The first symptoms of necroeconomic zombie-ing emerged in the immediate aftermath of the August 1998 crisis²⁹⁷ giving rise to the phenomenon of the post-Communist zombie-economy.²⁹⁸ The longevity of the current economic crisis could, therefore, have far more serious repercussions for Russia than previous crises.

A Negative Impact on Serbia

As early as December 2008, the Serbian government had warned of the possibility that the global financial crisis might negatively affect the country's economy.²⁹⁹ Previously, however, some members of the government remained confident that the global financial crisis would bypass Serbia.³⁰⁰ Although Serbia's banking system is mostly foreign owned and was well capi-

293 Markesinis, "The American and Russian Economies in Moments of Crisis: A Geopolitical Study in Parallel," 27.

294 See, for example, Igor Torbakov, "Yukos Bankruptcy: The Big Picture," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 151 (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 3 August 2006), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31949.

295 Apevalova and Radygin, "Bankrotstva v dvukhtysiachnye gody: ot instrumenta rei'derov k politike "dvojnogo standarta" 117.

296 SU-HSE and IAC, "Otsenka antikrizisnykh mer po podderzhke real'nogo sektora rocijskoj ekonomiki," 41.

297 Lindsey, *Against the Dead Hand*, 210.

298 *Ibid.*, 211.

299 Government of the Republic of Serbia – Office of the Prime Minister, "The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Serbian Economy: Framework of Measures," December 2008, http://www.media.srbija.sr.gov.yu/medeng/documents/economic_crisis280109.pdf (accessed 29 January 2010).

300 See, for example, Aija Kuge, "Kak global'nyi' krizis skazalsia na ekonomike Serbii" [How the Global Crisis Affected the Economy of Serbia], *Radio Svoboda* [Radio Liberty], 10 June 2009, <http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/transcript/1751510.html>.

talised at the outset of the global financial crisis³⁰¹ – a fact of paramount importance for maintaining financial stability – the country was negatively affected by the crisis.³⁰² The impact became particularly apparent in 2009, while GDP increased by 5.5% in 2008 as compared to 2007, it is expected that it decreased by 2.9% in 2009 as compared to 2008.³⁰³ In 2008 and 2009, the annual inflation rates were observed at 8.6%³⁰⁴ and 6.6%, respectively.³⁰⁵

Serbian industry faces an even more difficult situation as industrial output, which increased by 1.1% in 2008 as compared to 2007, fell by 12.6% in 2009.³⁰⁶ The decrease is caused mostly by the problems created in the manufacturing industry.³⁰⁷ As early as the initial stage of the economic crisis, it was clear that the crisis would mostly affect the metal producing and processing industry.³⁰⁸

Privatisation is linked indirectly to the emergence and existence of a necroeconomy in Serbia. Given that it is practically impossible to undertake production in the newly privatised companies whose technologies have become obsolete, the new owners use these enterprises for covering the debts accrued before the privatisation process.³⁰⁹ In Belgrade, it should be noted, the main motivation for purchasing such enterprises with outdated technological infrastructures is simply to acquire real estate rather than putting any of them into operation.³¹⁰

As early as autumn 2008, concern was expressed that the government would have to enhance its role both in the financial and the real sector of the country's economy due to the global fi-

301 Gavras and Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," 10.

302 Djordje Djukić and Mališa Djukić, "The Global Financial Crisis and the Behaviour of Short-Term Interest Rates – International and Serbian Aspects," *Panoeconomicus* 56, no. 4 (2009): 497-503, http://www.panoeconomicus.rs/casopis/2009_4/05%20Djordje%20Djukic.pdf.

303 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS), "Economic Trends in the Republic of Serbia in 2009," *Communication*, no. 355, year LIX, 30 December 2009, 2, <http://webzrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/en/dokumenti/saopstenja/KS10/ks10122009.pdf>.

304 SORS, "Consumer Price Index by COICOP – December 2008," *Communication*, no. 7, year LIX, 15 January 2009, <http://webzrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/en/dokumenti/saopstenja/CN11/cn11122008.pdf>.

305 SORS, "Consumer Price Index by COICOP – December 2009," *Communication*, no. 6, year LX, 15 January 2010, <http://webzrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/en/dokumenti/saopstenja/CN11/cn11122009.pdf>.

306 SORS, "Economic Trends in the Republic of Serbia in 2009."

307 SORS, "Industrial Production Indices, December 2009," *Communication*, no. 20, year LX, 29 January 2010, <http://webzrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/en/dokumenti/saopstenja/IN10/in10122009.pdf>.

308 Government of the Republic of Serbia – Office of the Prime Minister, "The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Serbian Economy," 5.

309 Ian Bancroft, "Protesting Privatisation in Serbia," *bne—businessneweurope*, 8 October 2009, 42, http://businessneweurope.eu/story1800/Protesting_privatisation_in_Serbia.

310 Ibid.

financial crisis.³¹¹ Several months before the global crisis spread to Serbia, the country's Presidential, Parliamentary and local self-government elections were held thereby allowing the government to work out anti-crisis measures under the conditions of political stability.³¹² However, the government was not consistent and did not manage to meet the conditionalities of the IMF; it failed to increase public sector salaries and to cut 8,000 state bureaucracy jobs, thus putting at risk the possibility of receiving further financial assistance allocated by the IMF.³¹³ It should be noted that the practice established in Serbia envisages a partial subsidisation from the public budget of investment projects in various sectors of the economy, including the manufacturing sector.³¹⁴

Due to the crisis, the government subsidised the bank interest in order to support the real sector.³¹⁵ At the end of 2008, it decided, on the one hand, that the financial sector would receive governmental guarantees as a basis for the implementation of certain incentive measures in the industrial sector.³¹⁶ It was considered appropriate, for example, to issue sovereign guarantees to the benefit of the National Bank of Serbia which would approve loans to banks that would then offer loans to businesses upon favourable terms.³¹⁷ The interest write-off for unpaid taxes and contributions – if they are settled on a regular basis – is to be used for decreasing the fiscal burden.³¹⁸ On the other hand, the government imposed severe restrictions upon non-productive expenditures for the companies in which the majority ownership is in the hands of the state.³¹⁹

The Serbian government considers it necessary to give priority to the bankruptcy and liquidation process during the economic crisis.³²⁰ There is a lack of trust amongst creditors towards the

311 Radovan Jelašić, "The Impact of the Crisis on Serbia's Financial Sector" (speech by Mr Radovan Jelašić, Governor of the National Bank of Serbia, at the "Conference on the Future of Financial Markets of Central and South East Europe," Sarajevo), *The Bank for International Settlements Review*, 23 October 2008, 1-2, <http://www.bis.org/review/r081028b.pdf>.

312 Mladjan Dinkic, "Global Crisis in the Balkans: Serbia's Fiscal Plans and Future EU Membership," *Harvard International Review* 31, no. 2 (Summer 2009), <http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/205506325.html>.

313 Aleksandra Nenadovic, "Serbia May Fail to Meet Bailout Terms," *Bloomberg.com*, 4 February 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aFMorc4wcZDw>.

314 Dinkic, "Global Crisis in the Balkans: Serbia's Fiscal Plans and Future EU Membership."

315 "Statement by H.E. Mirko Cvetkovic, Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, at the United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development," New York, 24 June 2009, http://www0.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/statements/serbia_en.pdf.

316 Government of the Republic of Serbia, "The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Serbian Economy," 7.

317 Ibid., 11.

318 Ibid., 12.

319 Ibid., 10.

320 Ibid., 9.

existing bankruptcy procedures.³²¹ The major problem is the so-called “implementation gap,” that is the situation when the implementation of the legislation on bankruptcy lags behind its quality.³²² It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that Serbia needs faster and more efficient enforcement of bankruptcy procedures³²³ in order to support their viable implementation. Finally, given the low efficiency of the bankruptcy procedures, the anti-crisis measures developed by the government create a real threat of zombie-ing the economy.

The Case of Turkey

The impact of the global financial crisis upon the economy of Turkey was apparent as early as the fourth quarter of 2008 when GDP fell to 6.5% resulting in a moderate increase by 0.9% in 2008; in the first three quarters of 2009, GDP dropped further to 8.4%.³²⁴ The annual inflation rate was observed at 10.4% in 2008, where it was expected to be 5.9% in 2009.³²⁵

While Turkey – like Greece – is free from a necroeconomy given that it was never a Communist country, its industrial output experiences a significant decrease mainly due to the decrease of demand on the international markets.³²⁶ It was expected that industry output would drop by 9.8% in 2009.³²⁷ The Turkish banking system has shown resilience to the global financial crisis as a result of reform measures that enabled its strengthening.³²⁸ After the 2001 crisis,³²⁹ economic reforms were carried out to correct past mistakes. This experience will hopefully give further impetus to Turkey to continue reforming its economy so that it will be properly prepared for any future crisis.³³⁰

321 Kuge, “Kak global’nyi’ krizis skazalsia na ekonomike Serbii.”

322 Robert Gourley and Mahesh Uttamchandani, “From Sea to Shining Sea: How Serbia and South-Eastern Europe Have Taken the Lead on Insolvency Law,” *International Corporate Rescue* 2, no. 1 (2005): 2-5, <http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/articles/sea.pdf>.

323 Srdjan Marinkovic, “Credit Crunch in Serbia and the Challenge of Global Financial Crisis,” *International Finance Corporation*, 2009, [http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/RegionalConferenceinSouthEastEuropeNov09SrdjanMarinkovic/\\$FILE/SrdjanMarinkovic.pdf](http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/RegionalConferenceinSouthEastEuropeNov09SrdjanMarinkovic/$FILE/SrdjanMarinkovic.pdf).

324 Turkish Statistical Institute, “Growth Rates of Expenditure on the Gross Domestic Product (at 1998 Prices),” 2009, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=1002.

325 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Turkey: Economy,” *The World Factbook*, 26 January 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html> (accessed 29 January 2010).

326 Mustafa Kutlay, “Turkish Economy amid Global Financial Turmoil” (Ankara: International Strategic Research Organisation, 21 November 2008), <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=768>.

327 CIA, “Turkey: Economy.”

328 Gavras and Iorga, “The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region,” 11.

329 See, for example, Levent Koch and M.A. Chaudhary, “February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and Consequences,” *The Pakistan Development Review* 40, no. 4 (2001): 467-86, <http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/2001/Volume4/467-486.pdf>.

330 Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, “The Global financial crisis and Turkey” (paper presented at the TÜSIAD – High Advisory Council Meeting, Bodrum, Turkey, 18 June 2009), 11, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/Resources/Ngozi_Okonjo-Iweala_KeynoteAddress_at_TUSIADHighAdvisoryCouncil_June2009.pdf.

The government's anti-crisis measures envisage its greater involvement in the economy.³³¹ In March 2009, it issued the package of US\$3.2 billion that focuses mostly upon a reduction in tax rates.³³² The government divides the country's territory into four categories based upon their level of economic development (with the first category being described as the most developed and the fourth as the most undeveloped). Accordingly, the 20% corporate tax for the most developed region was halved while it was reduced to 8%, 4% and 2% for the second, third and fourth categories, respectively.³³³

Of particular note is the government's support for the sizeable energy, automobile and mining sectors, alongside other large scale projects.³³⁴ Turkey undertook a series of initiatives such as a credit guarantee scheme for enterprises – with special attention to SMEs – in order to strengthen the real economy during the crisis.³³⁵ The government intends to preserve this policy for 2010-12. During this period it envisages to provide SMEs with a Treasury support guarantee in order to expand credit channels and to meet the collateral needs of SME financing.³³⁶ This decision in fact resembles the process of zombie-ing the Japanese economy. The government allows for unpaid taxes to be restructured in order to lessen the social and economic effects of the crisis.³³⁷ Keeping in mind that the country's legislation foresees the postponement of bankruptcy, it is obvious that the restructuring of the unpaid taxes aims at maintaining the bankrupt businesses on the market for a certain period – a process that facilitates a possible zombie-ing of Turkey's economy.

According to the Governor of the Central Bank, economic recovery is expected to be gradual and slow in the aftermath of the crisis, as opposed to the rapid recovery of economic activity after the 1994 and 2001 crises in Turkey.³³⁸

331 Mustafa Kutlay, "The Turkish Response to the Global Financial Crisis: For Whom the Bell Tolls?" *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 27 March 2009, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3124/the-turkish-response-to-the-global-financial-crisis-for-whom-the-bell-tolls.html>.

332 Simeon Djankov, "Turkey's Stimulus," *The World Bank Crisis Talk*, 17 March 2009, <http://crisistalk.worldbank.org/2009/03/turkeys-stimulus.html>.

333 "Turkey: Gov't Launches New Incentives Package, Focus on Investments," *Today's Zaman*, 5 June 2009, <http://www.seeurope.net/?q=node/17548>.

334 Ibid.

335 Ali Babacan, "Global Financial Crisis and the Turkish Economy" (paper presented at the London School of Economics European Institute meeting, 17 September 2009), 16, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20090917_AliBabacan.pdf.

336 Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, *Republic of Turkey: Medium Term Programme (2010-2012)*, (Ankara: Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, September 2009), 19.

337 Ibid., 16.

338 Durmuş Yılmaz, "Turkey's Economy and the Financial Crisis" (opening speech at The Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting, Istanbul, 1 July 2009), 2, <http://www.bis.org/review/r091029b.pdf>.

A Three-Front Crisis for Ukraine

As the global financial crisis started to spread towards the Eastern European countries, rather pessimistic forecasts were made for Ukraine.³³⁹ Bearing in mind all recent developments having taken place in the country, these forecasts do not come as a surprise. Unfortunately, the turbulent political life that characterised the country for years had significant repercussions, thus leaving the Ukrainian economy extremely vulnerable to the ongoing crisis.³⁴⁰ The country's economic and financial situation has been aggravated by the continuous inactivity of its Parliament and, generally, by the inefficiency of the main governmental institutions.³⁴¹ As a rule, political instability in Ukraine reflects mostly on the country's financial system.³⁴² A clear example of this was the 20% drastic depreciation of the hryvnya – Ukraine's national currency – within a short period after the beginning of the crisis,³⁴³ eventually reaching 50%.³⁴⁴

Ukraine, therefore, is the country most affected by the global financial crisis,³⁴⁵ having experienced the worst economic downturn amongst the Black Sea Region countries. Compared to 2007, real GDP increased only by 2.1%³⁴⁶ in 2008 whilst the situation significantly deteriorated in 2009 with GDP decreasing by 20.3%, 17.8% and 15.9% during the first, second and third quarters respectively compared with the same period in 2008.³⁴⁷ It is expected that GDP will de-

339 See, for example, Damien McElroy and Tim Wall, "Ukraine Suffers from the Economic Crisis Along with the Rest of Eastern Europe," *Telegraph.co.uk*, 25 October 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/recession/3260054/Ukraine-suffers-from-the-economic-crisis-along-with-the-rest-of-Eastern-Europe.html>.

340 Ben Aris, "Ukraine in a Mess," *bne—businessneweurope*, 29 September 2009, 12 http://businessneweurope.eu/story1788/Ukraine_in_a_mess; Anders Åslund, *How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), 231.

341 Tamara Panfilova, "Ukraine: Economy," in *Central Eurasia 2008* (Luleå: CA&CC Press, 2009), 364, 374.

342 Åslund, *How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy*, 229-30; Gavras and Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," 11; Natalia Khylychshyna, "Fighting the Financial Crisis in Ukraine's Banking Sector," *China Law & Practice*, February 2009, <http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/2097515/Channel/7576/Fighting-the-financial-crisis-in-Ukraines-banking-sector.html>; Panfilova, "Ukraine: Economy," 372-3.

343 Pavel Korduban, "Ukraine Moves to Stabilize Financial System," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 217 (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 12 November 2008), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34121.

344 L. Grigoriev, S. Agibalov, and M. Salikhov, "Ukraina: razdvoenie transformatsii" [Ukraine: Divarication of Transformation], *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Economic Issues] 3 (2009): 140.

345 Gavras and Iorga, "The Impact of the Current Economic and Financial Crisis on the Black Sea Region," 11.

346 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (SSCU), "Gross Domestic Product," 14 July 2009, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> (accessed 9 February 2010).

347 SSCU, "The Change of Gross Domestic Product Volume, 2009," 30 December 2009, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> (accessed 9 February 2010).

crease by 14.1% in 2009 as compared to 2008.³⁴⁸ Ukraine's inflation was quite high in 2008 and 2009: it reached 22.3%³⁴⁹ and 12.3% respectively.³⁵⁰

The country's industrial output also decreased significantly in 2009. Specifically, industrial output indices for this year were observed at 78.1% of 2008 rates.³⁵¹ Industry also experienced difficulties in 2008 as the indices for industrial output stood at 96.9% of 2007 numbers.³⁵² The mining and metallurgy, chemical and machine building industries – which are very low value-adding ones³⁵³ – encountered severe problems³⁵⁴ that can be attributed to the lack of technological innovation.³⁵⁵ Also, most of the steel producers' production is insufficient.³⁵⁶ Notably, the short term forecasts for the development of these industries are also unfavourable.³⁵⁷

The abovementioned situation is to be expected considering that Ukraine's economy, especially its industry, is quite burdened with the necroeconomy. The preservation of the necroeconomy in Ukraine has been facilitated by significant long-standing industry subsidies, which were allocated both from the national budget and the energy sector (the government subsidised energy companies so that they would supply energy to industrial enterprises at a lower price).³⁵⁸ As a result, the process of openly subsidising the industrial sector was replaced by a hidden subsidisation.³⁵⁹

The Ukrainian Parliament adopted anti-crisis laws several times since the harsh onset of the global financial crisis. The laws mainly provided for making changes in order to downplay the

348 CIA, "Ukraine: Economy," *The World Factbook*, 26 January 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html> (accessed 29 January 2010).

349 SSCU, "Consumer Price Indices for Goods and Services in 2008," 6 January 2009, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> (accessed 9 February 2010).

350 SSCU, "Consumer Price Indices for Goods and Services in 2009," 9 February 2010, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> (accessed 9 February 2010).

351 SSCU, "Indices for Industrial Output in 2009," 20 January 2010, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> (accessed 9 February 2010).

352 SSCU, "Indices for Industrial Output in 2008," 23 February 2009, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> (accessed 9 February 2010).

353 Gavras, "The Current State of Economic Development in the Black Sea Region," 15.

354 Panfilova, "Ukraine: Economy," 366.

355 Grigoriev, Agibalov and Salikhov, "Ukraina: razdvoenie transformatsii," 139.

356 Åslund, *How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy*, 230.

357 Ildar Gazizullin, "What Has the Crisis Meant for Ukraine?" *ICPS Newsletter*, no. 2 (465) (Kyiv: ICPS, 25 January 2010), 1, http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/55/40/nl_eng_20100125_0465.pdf.

358 Olexander Babanin, Vladimir Dubrovskiy and Oleksiy Ivaschenko, "Ukraine: The Lost Decade... and the Coming Boom?" in *The Economic Prospects for the CIS: Sources of Long Term Growth*, ed. Gur Ofer and Richard Pomfret (Cheltenham Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), 82-84; Grigoriev, Agibalov and Salikhov, "Ukraina: razdvoenie transformatsii," 127.

359 Babanin, Dubrovskiy and Ivaschenko, "Ukraine: The Lost Decade... and the Coming Boom?" 87.

negative impact of the crisis. The first such law was adopted as early as autumn 2008. It envisaged, inter alia, the creation of a government stabilisation fund in order to help companies repay foreign debts and invest in domestic projects.³⁶⁰ Such an anti-crisis measure, however, only facilitates the zombie-ing of the economy. Moreover, the government has relatively scarce financial resources for carrying out large scale governmental programmes.³⁶¹

The World Bank recommended that the government works out completely different types of anti-crisis measures. These included: focusing upon the macroeconomic stability of the country; channelling the budget funds to the development of the infrastructure and the protection of the poor and vulnerable; working out a clear strategy to protect depositors and rehabilitate the banking sector; and making reforms for enabling business entry and attracting private investment.³⁶² These recommendations, unfortunately, were not taken into consideration.

In spring 2009, the Parliament adopted the Farming Anti-Crisis Law in order to assist the country's farmers. According to this law, lending to farmers is to be increased through governmental support, with the animal farmers (for meat production) and milk producers being subsidised through the value added taxes together with a moratorium on the sale of agricultural land.³⁶³ According to another anti-crisis law adopted in autumn 2009, the use of foreign currency in the country is limited and an additional control is introduced on foreign trade, amongst others. All investors, for example, are obliged to be registered and to make investments only in hryvnya and individuals are prohibited from providing loans in a foreign currency except for medical and educational purposes.³⁶⁴ International experience shows that such restrictions usually facilitate illegal currency operations. Consequently, in parallel to the legal exchange rate of the hryvnya, a much worse illegal exchange rate has been established. This will be quite an impending factor towards increasing the attractiveness of Ukraine's economy for private investors.

Considering all of the above, the government's anti-crisis measures are evaluated as being largely ineffective overall.³⁶⁵ The lack of effective bankruptcy law facilitates the zombie-ing of Ukraine's economy and, specifically, that of its necroeconomy. As a result, even before the current crisis began, half of the industrial enterprises were experiencing losses whilst writing off

360 Korduban, "Ukraine Moves To Stabilize Financial System."

361 Grigoriev, Agibalov and Salikhov, "Ukraina: razdvoenie transformatsii," 139.

362 Martin Raiser, "Why Ukraine Must Act Now to Implement an Anti-Crisis Plan," *Zerkalo nedeli*, 13-20 April 2009, <http://www.mw.ua/2000/2020/65893/>.

363 "Ukraine: Farming Anti-Crisis Law," US-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC), 18 March, 2009, <http://www.usubc.org/news/membernews/ssd031809.php>.

364 Jared Grubb and Olexiy Soshenko, "New Anti-Crisis Law in Ukraine," Lexology, 23 November 2009, <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ff396f7c-8985-4b8b-8d1d-f7bbe788355a>.

365 Gazizullin, "What has the Crisis Meant for Ukraine?" 1.

their debts and generally avoiding bankruptcy within alliances between the management of enterprises and governmental officials.³⁶⁶

Although the legislation on bankruptcy was subject to a periodical update,³⁶⁷ the current law, unfortunately, remains significantly flawed.³⁶⁸ Ukraine's economy is, thus, mostly one of a necroeconomy with the activities of the government providing fertile soil for a zombie-ing of the economy (and, of course, a necroeconomy) under the conditions of the ongoing financial and economic crisis.

366 Babanin, Dubrovskiy and Ivaschenko, "Ukraine: The Lost Decade... and the Coming Boom?" 92.

367 Alexander Biryukov, "Bankruptcy and Legislative Reform in Ukraine," *Review of Central and East European Law* 27, no.4 (2001): 581-600, <http://www.biryukov.com.ua/public/bankruptcy.pdf>.

368 See, for example, "Foreign Investors Have Concerns about Unpredictability of Bankruptcy Procedure in Ukraine" (Kyiv: Foundation for Effective Governance), 12 January 2010, http://www.feg.org.ua/en/news/foundation_press/161.html.

CONCLUSIONS

Ten out of twelve countries in the Black Sea Region are post-Communist ones; only Greece and Turkey do not have a Communist past, whilst others are still burdened with the command economy to various extents. Of these, only Bulgaria and Romania can be regarded as successful cases. They joined the EU after having implemented significant reforms. The remaining eight countries are either not interested in EU membership (for instance, Russia) or have a long way to go before they reach EU standards (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine). They can be placed, therefore, in the group of “outsider” post-Communist countries as opposed to Bulgaria and Romania which can be considered “leader” post-Communist countries of the Black Sea Region.

The post-Communist countries of the Black Sea Region shared common starting conditions and similar challenges twenty years ago and are currently encountering common problems under the conditions of the global crisis. Key objectives, however, and the means to achieve them differ according to the Communist or non-Communist pasts (Greece and Turkey), or to the extent they overcame the Communist past (as “leader” countries) or they are enslaved by their Communist heritage (as “outsider” countries).

Although the transitional period in “outsider” post-Communist countries has ended, unfortunately, the economic (and political) system of some is far from that of European style capitalism. The phenomenon of the “outsider” post-Communist countries can be explained by the human factor.

The dead enterprises which the “outsider” countries received as their legacy of the command economy have proven to be quite “tenacious of life.” As a consequence, the market economies of “outsider” countries have been hampered by the burden of a necroeconomy.

The occurrence of financial crises has encouraged the emergence of a kind of routine which guarantees the stability of a government’s bailout programmes implemented throughout the banking sector in support of de-facto bankrupt firms. As a result, a network of zombie-banks and zombie-firms develops upon which the entire system of a zombie-economy rests.

The threat of an economy’s zombie-ing is even greater in the “outsider” countries given that this process also has much to do with a necroeconomy which is a factor that will make it rather difficult to improve an economy’s health after the end of the financial crisis. The threat of zombie-ing the economy is more acute in the “outsider” group of countries given that the process of zombie-ing and the necroeconomy are interlinked. This is a factor that will obstruct economic recovery at the end of the financial crisis.

The only effective mechanism to get rid of both a necroeconomy and a zombie-economy is to adopt a sound bankruptcy law which, in turn, requires the strong political will of the ruling elite.

Certainly, there are more frequent cases of companies and banks becoming insolvent during an economic crisis although it is very difficult for a government to put into effect the bankruptcy legislation by initiating its activation. As a rule, governments are interested in artificially maintaining the employment level thereby facilitating the maintenance of insolvent companies and banks in business in times of economic crisis. It is of great importance, therefore, the extent to which a government will go to continue supporting insolvent companies and banks in the post-crisis period and to what degree it will facilitate simplifying bankruptcy procedures.

The degree of openness of the democratic institutions and the extent of the reformation and transparency of the public administration system will be of significant importance for the Black Sea Region countries in the post-crisis period.³⁶⁹ How the government of a country will be able to avoid zombie-ing the economy depends in part upon the aforementioned factors.

Under the conditions of the current financial and economic crisis, the anti-crisis measures of all the Black Sea Region countries contain the threat of zombie-ing the economy whilst those of “outsider” countries (except Georgia) could also lead to the zombie-ing of the necroeconomy – a much worse phenomenon.

The countries without a post-Communist past and the “leader” post-Communist countries of the region are likely to face better economic conditions in the post-crisis period. This optimism is founded upon the relatively higher effectiveness of the bankruptcy legislation. Despite the challenges arising from the current financial and economic crisis, the bankruptcy processes in these countries are more dynamic³⁷⁰ compared to the other countries of the region. Amongst these, the situation is quite critical in Greece due to the country’s particular debt crisis.

A great majority of the “outsider” countries of the region encounter a real threat of zombie-ing the necroeconomy. In this respect, the situation is the worst in Russia and Ukraine whose governments significantly assisted and enabled necroeconomic enterprises before the financial and economic crisis began and have provided even more assistance since. A similarly difficult situation has developed in Albania and Moldova.

The political instability makes it difficult for any of the governments to say no to populist measures. This situation has severely impacted Moldova and Ukraine. Political stability, however, does not necessarily mean that a government will be free from populism as is the case, unfortunately, with the Serbian experience.

369 See, for example, Stella Ladi, *Good Governance and Public Administration Reform in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Member States*, Xenophon Paper, no. 6 (Athens: ICBSS, December 2008), http://icbss.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=45.

370 Ramalho, Rodríguez-Meza and Yang, “How are Firms in Eastern and Central Europe Reacting to the Financial Crisis?”

In the post-crisis period, the state whose government possesses the political determination to cease managing the economy through zombie-ing mechanisms, will eventually thrive. This is particularly important for the “outsider” countries of the Black Sea Region, which are already “afflicted” with the necroeconomy.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX I

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Vladimer Papava is Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Chief Research Associate at the Paata Gugushvili Institute of Economics, and Senior Associate Fellow of the Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center at the South Asia-Caucasus Institute (Johns Hopkins University-SAIS). He previously served as Minister of Economy of the Republic of Georgia (1994-2000) and Member of Parliament (2004-08). In 2005-06 he was a Fulbright Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, the Nitze School–SAIS, Johns Hopkins University (Washington, D.C.). He is the author of more than 200 publications, including works on the theoretical and applied studies of post-Communist economies and economic development of the Central Caucasus countries. Dr. Papava holds a Degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences from Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1982), a Degree of Doctor of Economic Sciences from Leningrad State University (1990), and Tbilisi State University (1989).

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Necroeconomics: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism. New York: iUniverse, 2005.

Splendours and Miseries of the IMF in Post-Communist Georgia. Laredo TX: We-publish.com, 2003.

Financial Globalization and Post-Communist Georgia. New York: iUniverse, 2003 (with Vepkhia Chocheli).

ANNEX II

ABBREVIATIONS

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
SMEs	Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Panagiota Manoli | July 2007 |
| No. 1 | <i>Decision-Making in the BSEC: A Creative Cartography of Governance</i>
Ioannis Stribis | July 2006 |

Written by Vladimer Papava, this *Xenophon Paper* touches upon the consequences of the crisis on the countries of the Black Sea region in a specific analytical framework. Based on his own “theory of necroeconomics,” Papava assesses, in the context of the ongoing crisis, the key economic obstacles that the countries of the region face in achieving sustainable economic development. His analysis is based on two economic phenomena: the “necroeconomy” and the “zombie-economy.” A “necroeconomy,” which is created by uncompetitive industries (the “necrocompanies”) that are remnants of the command economy, differentiates the economy of post-Communist capitalism from all other models of capitalism. In times of economic crisis, though, “necrocompanies” can also appear in developed economies, as “zombie-firms,” creating a “zombie-economy.”

Following his theory, the author divides the countries of the Black Sea region in two groups: transition states (the “leaders,” to the extent they overcame their Communist past and the “outsiders,” for those that are enslaved by their Communist heritage) and non-transition states (Turkey and Greece). Thus, the key objectives and the means to achieve them differ for each country according to the category they belong. Based on the abovementioned categorisation, Papava’s analysis suggests that while most of the “outsider” countries are more vulnerable to the consequences of the crisis, non-transition states and the “leader” countries are likely to face better economic conditions in the post-crisis period.